Making Sense of Matter
in Deleuze's Conception of Cinema Language
Roger Dawkins
<1> Writing in the 1960s
and early 1970s, Christian Metz's work on the cinema favoured systematic exactitude,
and was concerned with uprooting film theory from what he saw as the "generalized"
approach of the early twentieth century (Andrews 213). Metz thought that a more
scientific approach to the cinema was to be found with the question of language,
and although this question was metaphorically present since the 1920s [1],
Metz was the first to apply modern linguistic models to this problem (Guzzetti
292). What resulted was a methodology of analysis based on the formalism inherent
to Ferdinand de Saussure's and Louis Hjelmslev's linguistics. This meant that
Metz determined cinema as a "textual system," with the image wholly
subordinate to an external structure for its meaningful articulation.
<2> For Gilles Deleuze
though, writing at the tail end of structuralism in the mid-1980s, such an emphasis
on this kind of formalism drastically reduces the creative potential of the
image. His idea of language is aligned with the poststructuralist debates of
the late 1970s, debates that claimed the notion of the "totalizing system"
in structuralism to be fundamentally limiting to the possibility of thought
(Thomas 67) [2]. Approaching the cinema from
a philosophical background (which caused quite a stir) [3],
Deleuze contends the presupposition of formalism by claiming a prelinguistic
dimension of the image as the locus of language and meaningful articulations.
Whereas proponents of structuralism acknowledge a prelinguistic dimension that
presupposes structure, Deleuze rethinks the prelinguistic, suggesting it as
the matter from which language is a product, thereby opening up the potential
of language beyond the reflection of preconceived form.
<3> Since this conception
of the prelinguistic is largely a philosophical stance, Deleuze's application
of this thesis to the problem of language in the cinema suggests a return to
the kind of philosophical speculation Metz was trying to avoid. However, although
they are different projects, the intersection of both, as marked by Deleuze's
critique of Metz in the cinema books, nevertheless is important in problematizing
what the question of language in the cinema might involve and what this question
may entail.
<4> The aim of this
paper is to consider the importance of a prelinguistic stage in the idea of
language Deleuze outlines in his cinema books. More specifically, this concern
with the prelinguistic lies with its significance in enlightening Deleuze's
(brief) criticism of Metz's "language" of the cinema. In this respect,
what will become clear is that the "root" of Deleuze's "difficulty"
lies with Metz's conception of the prelinguistic, a conception that stems largely
from the structuralist perspective of his work.
<5> As a way of addressing such questions this paper will be organized as follows. In the first part, the prelinguistic will be posited as the principle of Deleuze's notion of cinematic language. Then, in the paper's second part, the prelinguistic will be considered specifically in relation to Metz and a problematization of the structural methodology he appropriates. However something which is beyond the scope of the present context is the unravelling of how Deleuze implements his perspective on the prelinguistic by way of the signs he formulates in the cinema books. This is a task underlying his entire cinematic project, and so this paper will content itself simply with identifying this principle as its stands in relation to both Metz and Deleuze.
The Language of the Cinema
<6> To begin with the
question of the prelinguistic, a good starting point is what it might involve.
Gary Genosko writes that in Felix Guattari's work on language, Guattari develops
an idea of the prelinguistic from his interpretation of Hjelmslev's semiotic.
In his Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (originally published as Omkring
Sprogteoriens Grundlæggelse in 1941), Hjelmslev describes language
as based on a "sign-function" that forms matter into substance according
to a matter-form-substance relation on a plane of expression and a plane of
content. For instance matter would be a sound and thought element, form
would be a language's rules of organization, and substance would be the
product of matter and form. Bearing this in mind, Genosko writes that with Guattari's
interpretation of the sign-function, matter is considered independently from
its formation as substance. Referring to the nature of matter's reality, Genosko
notes that Guattari is happy to label it a "matter-sense" in response
(181).
<7> In Guattari's conception,
considering the prelinguistic means reversing the matter-form-substance relation.
This is a reversal which refutes the priority of form and emphasizes a conception
of the prelinguistic anterior by right to its formation as substance. Moreover
this draws our attention to two notions of the prelinguistic: first, the prelinguistic
simply as matter prior to language (i.e. to its formation as substance); and
second, Guattari's notion of the prelinguistic as that which is not only before
language, but that which is necessarily independent of language too (matter-sense).
<8> If we turn to Guattari's
collaborations with Deleuze, we can note a further suggestion of the prelinguistic.
For example in A Thousand Plateaus (c1980, 1987) they describe a similar
sense of matter with the "plane of consistency." The plane of consistency
operates beneath formalized contents (or "strata") as the dimension
from which the regimes of signs constitutive of stratification are formed. Deleuze
and Guattari describe the plane of consistency in the following way: "The
most disparate of things and signs move upon it: a semiotic fragment rubs shoulders
with a chemical interaction, an electron crashes into a language, a black hole
captures a genetic message, a crystallization produces a passion..." (69).
<9> Also, we note the
development of two determining principles of the prelinguistic. First, the prelinguistic
matter is not amorphous: "The plane of consistency...is in no way an undifferentiated
aggregate of unformed matters, but neither is it a chaos of formed matters of
every kind" (70). The second principle suggested by Deleuze and Guattari
is that the prelinguistic is neither amorphous nor signifying. What is left
with these two principles is a thesis of the prelinguistic according to which
it is relative, by right, to nothing: "There is no 'like' here,
we are not saying 'like an electron,' 'like an interaction' etc. The plane of
consistency is the abolition of all metaphor; all that consists is Real"
(69).
<10> The claim in this
paper is that in Deleuze's work on the cinema, there is the same principle of
matter-sense underlying his taxonomy of images and signs. For instance in the
chapter "Recapitulation of Images and Signs," Deleuze suggests a notion
of language as the product of the movement-image and its relations. Therefore
it follows that the sign, as a formalization of expression, or "a
feature of expression" (Time 33) that comes to represent "a
type of image" (Movement 69), is always a product of the movement-image's
relations. To put this another way would be to say that an idea of the
sign never precedes the relation of terms constitutive of that sign, and rather
than having a representative or reflective function, the sign is more the presentation
of a specific aspect of the movement-image as matter-sense.
<11> However there is
more to the prelinguistic in the cinema than the idea of matter prior to its
formation as substance. The prelinguistic is also anterior by right to form,
and in this respect the above principles I outlined from A Thousand Plateaus
are wholly necessary to its nature. In the first case, the prelinguistic dimension
of movement-images, like the plane of consistency, is non-amorphous (29). In
order to maintain an independence from form, the prelinguistic cannot be amorphous,
because if the relation of movement-images constituted a chaotic or undifferentiated
mass, then it would be entirely necessary for an external structure to be present
in order to form this "blob" into meaningful articulations.
<12> The second principle
of the prelinguistic is that it is "a-syntaxic and a-signifying" for
the same reason it is not amorphous (29). Therefore when Deleuze describes the
prelinguistic movement-image in the cinema books as a "signaletic material"
which "includes all kinds of modulation features, sensory (visual and sound),
kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal and even verbal (oral and written)"
(29), it is important to note the above qualification of this material also.
For if the prelinguistic is not a-signifying and a-syntaxic, then it would be
an assemblage of possible significations. If the significations of a
language were present in its prelinguistic matter as possibles, then
implied is a formal structure in relation to which these significations are
possibilities, in turn meaning that the expression of matter is more the realization
of something external to its nature [4].
<13> Both principles
stem from a criticism at the heart of Deleuze's philosophy, a criticism steadfast
against the presupposition of transcendent structure. In this conception of
language, a transcendent structure limits the expression of the prelinguistic
to the reflection of form. The reflection of form is the suppression of creativity,
and for Deleuze this is a benign activity in any question of language (or philosophy)
[5].
<14> What we are left
with then are two notions of the prelinguistic. The first is the prelinguistic
as an amorphous and syntaxic matter, according to which a conception of language
is based on the formation of this matter into substance. The second is a more
positive notion of the prelinguistic as the matter-sense from which signs are
a product. In this respect the prelinguistic is not a reflection of some ratified
form, and thus there is more scope for creative expression. For this to be the
case the prelinguistic involves two principles: it is non-amorphous, but at
the same time it is a-syntaxic and a-signifying. The prelinguistic in this second
sense is the matter-sense of language, a matter-sense which proceeds not towards
some preestablished expression, but towards the truth of an expression which
is established at the same time.
Crises of Matter
<15> The problem of
this paper is the following: how does the prelinguistic illuminate the relation
between Deleuze and Metz in the cinema books? We can begin to see an answer
if we turn to Deleuze's discussion of fact and principle in The
Time-Image (1989). For instance Deleuze writes that the fact of the image
lies with its historical constitution as "narrative utterance" --
in other words according to the form implied by external narrative structures.
On the point of the widespread acceptance of narrative as the dominant mode
of cinematic language, Deleuze and Metz are in agreement. They differ however
because Deleuze accuses Metz of losing sight of this narrative fact, therefore
confusing fact and principle. I described above the principle of the image as
non-amorphous yet a-syntaxic, and so with the confusion of fact and principle
Deleuze sees Metz to be asserting the primacy of form at the expense of the
prelinguistic matter-sense.
<16> To approach this
problem we must look into the narrative model in order to see how it bears on
the prelinguistic in the cinema. In this respect the following passage is useful
in its capacity as a kind of summary criticism of the methodology behind Metz's
emphasis on narrative. Addressing the philosophical framework of Metz's approach
to be fundamentally Saussurean, Deleuze writes that Metz "applies certain
determinations which do not belong exclusively to the language system [langue],
but condition the utterances of a language [langage], even if this language
is not verbal and operates independently of a language system" (25). If
we look at the relation between narrative and linguistics in terms of langue
and langage we will see how Metz overlooks the principle of the image.
Moreover we will see this confusion as a structuralist dilemma in Metz's work
that takes into account Hjelmslev's ideas also. Such a structural perspective
implies, most importantly, a conception of the prelinguistic that Metz also
adopts, and it is this structuralist perspective on the prelinguistic that is
at the root of Deleuze's criticism of Metz.
<17> First of all, what
of the relationship between Saussure and Metz? Saussure began developing his
conception of linguistics in 1916,
which involved the division of natural language into a finite amount of minimum
units (phonemes) and an infinite number of compound articulations (monemes,
phrases and sentences). These articulations were based on certain rules or conventions,
and the totality of these rules at any given moment in history was what Saussure
called "langue." Based on the fact that language construes meaning
according to the double movement described above, from Andre Martinet we can
also suggest this procedure of langue as a "double articulation" [6].
With this conception of language, the object (or "referent") is most
importantly "bracketed" since linguistics constructs the object of
study based on the system of langue. Signification is therefore arbitrary, and
important is not the sense of language's relation to its object, but the formalism
according to which thought and meaning is construed. It was in the face of the
widespread acceptance of Saussurean linguistics as a methodological approach
to contemporary theory that Metz attempted to legitimise the study of the cinema,
thereby elevating its status to the level of academic discipline.
<18> With Saussure's
method in mind, Metz's early writing was concerned with this question of langue
in the cinema. Yet his project was frustrated when he claimed the basic unit
of the cinema to be the image's signification as a "complete segment of
reality" (Film Language 115). For instance consider his famous example:
"A close-up of a revolver...signifies 'Here is a revolver!'" (67).
Implied therefore were the following consequences: first, as a "complete
signification," Metz claimed an absence of "discreet elements"
(like the linguistic phoneme or seme), and this was unlike langue; and second,
signification in the cinema is anything but arbitrary (unlike langue also):
from the above example we can see how it was highly motivated for Metz.
Therefore Metz's initial assertion regarding the idea of langue was that there
is nothing resembling double articulation, and signification is motivated (114).
<19> However Metz soon
developed his thesis, shrinking the prior distance between cinema and langue.
For instance he later claims a sense of cinematic articulation, stating this
to be evident in the realisation of narrative through the cinema's formal elements.
These formal elements include, for example, editing, lighting, camera angles
and mise-en-scene. He later reconsidered his rejection of arbitrariness,
claiming a sense of the arbitrary with the narrative determination of the cinema
and the conventions of editing (Buckland 210).
<20> Therefore, although not being specifically the same, we can see Metz asserting a notion of langue with the formal elements associated with narrative. Moreover he narrowed this gap further by claiming a version of langue's syntagmatic and paradigmatic in the operation of cinematic narrative. Deleuze notes the significance of this move in The Time-Image:
[L]anguage features which necessarily apply to utterances will be found in the cinema, as rules of use, in the language system and outside of it: the syntagm (conjunction of present relative units) and the paradigm (disjunction of present units with comparable absent units). The semiology of the cinema will be the discipline that applies linguistic model, especially syntagmatic ones, to images as constituting one of their principle "codes" (25-26).
<21> What does this
idea of the syntagmatic involve? For Saussure, syntagms are a "horizontal"
dimension of language, and are the regular and typical patterns of structure
in the language system. As such, the syntagmatic is like the actualisation of
langue, which up until now was more of what Paul Thibault describes as a "virtual"
dimension. Langue is a "whole" then, and "has value" only
by virtue of the syntagmatic -- in other words, by virtue of "the relations
among the parts which comprise the whole" (261). Although the absence of
discrete elements complicates things slightly in the cinema, Metz nevertheless
asserted the syntagmatic at the level of the sequence. He claimed that
all films partake to some extent of eight principal syntagmatic "types"
[7].Furthermore, non-narrative (or "modern"
cinema) is simply a disturbance of the above syntagmatic grammar [8].
<22> The paradigmatic
on the other hand is the "vertical" dimension of a signification's
"associated relations" in linguistics. Thibault writes that this dimension
contains all the combinations possible in a given "syntagmatic solidarity"
[9]. Important though is that the paradigmatic
only eventuates based on the completed signification of a syntagm, and so meaning
is construed as a result of a signification's opposition to other possible significations
in the paradigmatic. At the level of the word, opposition occurs in the paradigmatic
dimension of a word's minimal units, yet in the face of its completed signification.
<23> For Metz a linguistic
sense of the paradigmatic -- whereby present units are clarified by absent units
-- is difficult because the paradigmatic dimension of an image is infinite in
possibility. Therefore, although initially like linguistics, since "The
filmic shot is...the result of the ordering of several elements (for example,
the different visual elements in the image -- what is sometimes called the interior
montage)" (116), the cinema is unlike langue because "these elements
are indefinite in number and undefined in nature" (116). However this does
not completely rule out the possibility of the paradigmatic, and we see this
at the level of the oppositions of Metz's eight syntagmatic types [10].
More specifically also, since these syntagmatic types are determined at the
level of the image's relation, the paradigmatic really begins with the type
of cut or edit, and the spatio-temporal relations between images [11].
<24> To sum up the problem
of Saussurean linguistics in the cinema, we can suggest a sense of langue for
Metz according to the above syntagmatic and paradigmatic operations of narrative.
In his quest to find an equivalent to langue, Metz settled on narrative because
of its capacity to function as the same kind of formal condition. Cinema therefore
is like a language system without double articulation and the arbitrary motivation
of its terms, and it is nevertheless linguistic since formalism is primary.
This is the sense of language Deleuze is addressing when he notes Metz's project
to involve "certain determinations which do not belong exclusively to the
language system [langue], but condition the utterances of a language
[langage]."
<25> At the same time though, it seems that what is really going on in Metz's approach to cinematic language is an emphasis on the notion of "systematic theory" seminal in Saussure's linguistics (Weber 914). Saussure's aim was to establish linguistics as an authentic and rigorous science, and necessarily involved was the establishment of a true and unique "object" of study. However natural language, being such a heterogeneous mass of "the physical, physiological and psychical domains" (916), eludes such a determination, and it was for this reason Saussure focused on langue as the most appropriate "object" of analysis. Samuel Weber describes the fecundity of such an approach as apparent in the following tenets of structuralism some years later:
i) the rejection of mere empirical observation or data as inadequate in establishing the object and method of science; ii) the tendency to construe science as a mode of description and of classification, as a taxonomy involving a semiotic system conceived as a closed, homogenous and discreet medium; iii) the conviction that the laws which govern the functioning of the sign system are independent both of the individual subjects participating in it and of the specific material embodiment of the sign; and finally, iv) the assertion that the object of semiotics is dependent upon a prior point of view, involving a certain conception of structure of science and its object (917).
What each of these tenets
point towards is an emphasis on the point of view as inaugural and wholly constitutive
of the object, and with this in mind the question of narrative in the cinema
is a translation of structuralism's emphasis on the systematic.
<26> In respect of structure,
it was suggested at the beginning of this paper that Hjelmslev's approach to
language could be interpreted from a similarly systematic point of view. In
his Prolegomena the formation of matter into substance according to the
"mutual solidarity" of the planes of content and expression is commonly
thought to be a "generalizing" of Saussure's signifier-signified relationship
(Buckland 205). As I noted earlier, the most traditional interpretation of language
in Hjelmslev's account is the following: it is a system that rests on
the principle of an amorphous thought and sound element ("purport"),
shaped by a concrete and formal structure ("sign-function")
(Hjelmslev 55). Distinguishing his approach from "philosophical" "speculation,"
Hjelmslev (like Saussure) claims an analysis of the formal system of language
to be most rigorous (6-7). Such an approach transcends "mere primitive
description" in favour of "a systematic, exact, and generalizing science"
with which "all events (possible combinations of elements) are foreseen"
and "the conditions for their realization established" (9).
<27> Warren Buckland
notes also the importance of Hjelmslev's account of structure in Metz's approach
to the problem of language in the cinema. He describes the following two principles
as significant in the development of Metz's project: 1) The capacity of Hjelmslev's
system to function as a "generalization" of Saussure's signifier-signified
relation: Hjelmslev's linguistic analysis is significant because it "does
not stop at entities whose content and expression are correlated" (205);
2) In terms of its relation to the history of semiology, Hjelmslev's work "developed
a deductive procedure designed to analyse all communication activity,
which were defined as semiotic if they could be organised into an expression
plane and a content plane, each analysable into form, material and substance"
(206). In Language and Cinema (19??) Metz acknowledges this relationship,
noting his interpretation of substance as "the meeting of form and
material...it is...that which appears when a form happens to organise a material"
(209-210).
<28> Each of these ideas
constitutes an overarching systematic point of view in Metz's approach to the
cinema whereby form is wholly required for meaningful articulation. Such is
a presupposition of formalism according to which narrative is only one
specific manifestation of systematic theory. As an example, consider the period
of Language and Cinema and Metz's revision of his earlier work in the
collection Essais sur la signification au cinema I (1971). In the original
essay "Le Cinema: Langue ou Langage?" (1964), Metz claims the image
reflects a basic notion of reality according to Mikel Dufrenne's thesis of "natural"
signification -- in other words, "when a signification is somehow immanent
to a thing" (78). In the footnotes appended to his later revisions in Essais,
Metz changes tact slightly, claiming that an image's so-called natural signification
really only marks the subject's invisible "assimilation" of a cultural
code (78). In the first instance signification is a given and the identity of
the code is presupposed, while in the second instance the transcendent ideology
is simply more explicit in its capacity as cultural ideology. In both
what is primary and what is most important is the ideology actualised by the
object, and we can say that both suggest the object as an example of matter
that cannot be considered independently of form [12].
<29> In all of this,
a structuralist position boils down to the presupposition of form (as a transcendent
point of view) in the matter-form-substance relation with which I began this
paper. Therefore the root of Deleuze's difficulty with Metz lies with his structuralist
point of view on the prelinguistic, since in contrast, matter for Deleuze and
Guattari most importantly can be considered independently of form: it
is matter-sense. With the matter-sense of the prelinguistic, terms in
language are not limited to the reflection of form, and in the cinema images
need not be reduced to the representation of narrative codes. Instead, "They
are the object of a perpetual reorganization" (Time 265).
Final Words
<30> As a way of concluding, consider the following footnote and how the question of matter is most revealing in Deleuze's dismissal of Metz:
The linguist Hjelmslev calls "content" [matter] precisely this element which is not linguistically formed although it is perfectly formed from other points of view. He says "not semiotically formed" because he identifies the semiotic function with the linguistic one. This is why Metz tends to exclude this material in his interpretation of Hjelmslev (Time 287 note 9).
Codes are not an evident given
in matter, and therefore matter can be considered independently of the linguistic
function. In other words matter is "perfectly formed from other points
of view": it is a "signaletic material" as Deleuze emphasizes
earlier in "Recapitulation of images and signs" (29). As I have said,
and Deleuze makes this perfectly clear, Metz's error lies with the fact that
his interpretation overlooks the independence of matter, excluding matter-sense,
and this stems directly from his emphasis on codes like narrative.
<31> Narrative was Metz's
answer to the problem of langue, and in its capacity as formal code, narrative
was simply another instance of a structural point of view that favours form
over matter. Therein lies the root of Deleuze's difficulty with Metz, a difficulty
that begins with narrative and takes into account the entire structural project.
What I have tried to show in this paper is that the principle underlying Deleuze's
concept of language in the cinema is based on the conception of the prelinguistic
as matter-sense, a prelinguistic dimension that is anterior by right to its
formation as substance.
Notes
[1] Stam
et. al. cites the metaphorical application of "language" to the cinema
in the 1920s by Riccioto Canuda, Louis Delluc, Vachel Lindsay and Bela Balazs
among others (28). [^]
[2] In this
respect see also Cinethique's critique of Metz in Screen v. 14,
n.1/2, pp. 189-214. [^]
[3] "In
Anglo-American circles...interest in the two volumes was tempered by skepticism,
not only about the source (a philosopher) but also about the sweep (roughly
six hundred pages)...Because the cinema books are positioned in an immense oeuvre,
part of 'une vie philosophique', they discourage reflection in toto..."
(Flaxman 2). [^]
[4] See Deleuze,
Difference (211ff.) for a more detailed explanation of the concept of
the possible. [^]
[5] Paul Patton
gives a useful summary of reflective/representational thought and non-representational/dynamic/creative
thought in "Anti-Platonism and Art" (144-145). [^]
[6] According
to Pasolini, Martinet "represents the final and defining movement of Saussurean
linguistics" (Pasolini 202). Buckland
describes this process as follows: "Verbal language is posited by Martinet
to be organised on two levels: the first (the higher) level is analysable into
meaningful units (morphemes) which are signs...; and a second, lower level,
consisting of non-meaningful units" (206). See A. Martinet, Elements
of General Linguistics. Trans. Elizabeth Palmer. London: Faber and Faber,
1964. [^]
[7] See Film
Language (124-126). [^]
[8] Deleuze:
"Christian Metz has no insurmountable difficulty in accounting for the
deliberate disturbances of narration in modern cinema: it is enough to point
to changes of structure in the syntagmatics" (Time 26). See also Deleuze's
footnote on this point (285 note 3). For examples from Metz, see "The
Modern Cinema and Narrativity" in Film Language (185-228). [^]
[9] See for
example Thibault chapter 11, "Dimensions of Contextualization: The Mechanism
of Langue" (257-303). [^]
[10] "[I]t
should be remarked that the existence of several types of image-ordering has
the effect of creating
a specific paradigmatic category, which is constituted
precisely by the total system of the different syntagmas" (Film Language
68 note). [^]
[11] Describing
a certain "value" of the cut, Metz writes: "This is the case
with the "fade-dissolve" duality within the framework of the "conjunction
of two sequences": a simple commutation, which the users -- that is to
say, the spectators -- perform spontaneously, makes it possible to isolate the
corresponding significates: a spatiotemporal break with the establishing of
an underlying link (dissolve), and a straightforward spatiotemporal break (fade)"
(Film Language 99). [^]
[12] Although
it is beyond the scope of this paper, Deleuze suggests that Metz's use of the
psychoanalytic model in The Imaginary Signifier reveals a similar presupposition
of form as the narrative/cultural model of Film Language and Language
and Cinema (Time 285 note 3). [^]
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