In the following article, Stacy Fussel Thorne addresses the timely, but neglected, topic of Rogerian argument. Based in the works of psychologist Carl Rogers, this method of argumentation is concerned with empathic listening and mutual benefit, rather than traditional conceptions of persuasion which reward strategies that result in victory. Of particular interest in the current geopolitical context and the "War on Terror", aggrieved nations, and post-nationalist enemies, Rogerian argument asks parties to seek understanding and avoid hostility -- opening the possibility of building lasting peace and democratic agency.

Rogerian Rhetoric as Negotiation: Does Its Dependence on Game Theory Pose Ethical Problems? [printable version]

Stacy Fussell Thorne

<1> In the war game Diplomacy, players win by gaining control of Europe. In order to win, however, players must successfully negotiate with other players, make alliances with them, and sometimes gain the support of their ally's military resources, their armies or fleets. In the rules of the game, Diplomacy is described as

a game of negotiations, alliances, promises kept, and promises broken. In order to survive, a player needs help from others. In order to win the game, a player must eventually stand alone. Knowing whom to trust, when to trust them, what to promise, and when to promise it is the heart of the game. Remember, you are a diplomat first, a commander second. (3)

The type of negotiation that occurs in Diplomacy is one in which, despite the alliances that have been made, the negotiator's purpose is ultimately to win. However, negotiation as rhetorical argument, which is similar to what rhetorical scholars call Rogerian argument, theoretically has a different purpose: to help opponents understand each other, to reduce conflict, and perhaps even to help parties reach consensus or resolve a problem so that everyone is mutually satisfied. This is a much different type of negotiation than what might occur between a buyer and seller or between players in a game like Diplomacy. Rogerian argument is a type of negotiation that is like problem-solving, whereas, the negotiation that occurs between players in Diplomacy, or buyers and sellers, is more contentious and linked to traditional argumentative purposes and persuasion.

<2> Richard Young, Alton Becker, and Kenneth Pike introduced what they called "Rogerian argument" to the disciplines of Rhetoric and Composition in their seminal text, Rhetoric: Discovery and Change (1970). They believed a new rhetoric was needed for two important reasons. First, they claimed that "as a result of rapid and mass means of communication and transportation," our world was becoming "smaller" (8). To become "citizens of the world," Young, Becker and Pike assert, "it has become imperative to develop a rhetoric that has as its goal not skillful verbal coercion but discussion and exchange of ideas" (8). Secondly, Young, Becker, and Pike argue that "the familiar essay," on which we still focus our students' efforts, seems "less relevant as a means of communication than, for instance, serious popular songs, group discussions, or articles written as tentative contributions to a continuing discussion within a large community of scholars (8). They believed that the formulations of rhetoric before 1970 were inadequate for addressing their rhetorical needs.

<3> The best-selling author and linguistics scholar, Deborah Tannen, shares a similar viewpoint. In her book, The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue (1998), Tannen explains that even our language reveals how contentious our culture is by the frequency in which our expressions are filled with military imagery: "Take a shot at it," "I don't want to be shot down," "He went off half cocked," "That's half the battle" (14). Tannen asserts that we are greatly affected by the words and phrases in our language because our language shapes the way we think about, and see, the world. Our contentious culture leads us to unnecessarily polarize issues. We think in terms of debate, that issues have two sides, and by doing this we ignore the complexity of issues and the nuances of many other positions, which can occur at various intervals on a continuum between two extremes. We frequently demonize our opponents and misunderstand them. Tannen believes that our culture needs to change by valuing achieving dialogue over winning a debate. She thinks we should try to understand those who are different from us instead of listening to them only so that we can find the weaknesses in their arguments to use against them.

<4> Carl Rogers' also valued achieving dialogue over winning a debate. Rogers, the psychotherapist on whose theories Young, Becker and Pike's Rogerian argument is based, worked frequently in his lifetime to bridge intercultural boundaries between longstanding enemies. Rogers worked as the facilitator of a group of Protestants and Catholics from Belfast, Ireland, whose bitter hatred of each other had developed over generations, and he also worked in South Africa with a black/white encounter group, which he believed made some progress toward mutual understanding (Rogers and Ryback 42).

<5> In A Way of Being (1980), Carl Rogers delineates a philosophy in which dialogue is valued over debate, or the attempt to understand and accept differing perspectives is valued over the attempt to perpetuate a single perspective. Rogers' philosophy is based on what he calls the "hypothesis of multiple realities," that there are as many realities as there are individuals to perceive those realities:

I, and many others, have come to a new realization. It is this: The only reality I can possibly know is the world as I perceive and experience it at this moment. The only reality you can possibly know is the world as you perceive and experience it at this moment. And the only certainty is that those perceived realities are different. There are as many "real worlds" as there are people! This creates a most burdensome dilemma, one never before experienced in history. (102)

Rogers' philosophy concerning multiple realities is oppositional to the goals of traditional argument. Whereas a traditional arguer typically attempts to persuade an audience to adopt that arguer's perspective, Rogers' philosophy recommends perpetuating the acceptance of a multiplicity of perspectives rather than perpetuating a single world view:

The question may well be raised, however, whether we could have a community or a society based on this hypothesis of multiple realities. Might not such a society be a completely individualistic anarchy? That is not my opinion. Suppose my grudging tolerance of your separate world view became a full acceptance of you and your right to have such a view. Suppose that instead of shutting out the realities of others as absurd or dangerous or heretical or stupid, I was willing to explore and learn about those realities? Suppose you were willing to do the same. What would be the social result? I think that our society would be based not on a blind commitment to a cause or creed or view of reality, but on a common commitment to each other as rightfully separate persons, with separate realities. The natural human tendency to care for another would no longer be "I care for you because you are the same as I," but, instead, "I prize and treasure you because you are different from me." (Rogers 105)

Whereas the players of the game Diplomacy negotiate while keeping in mind their ultimate goal of defeating their opponents, and buyers and sellers negotiate while both sides secretly hope to get the better deal, Carl Rogers believed negotiation could bridge boundaries between opponents, helping them to understand and tolerate each other. These scenarios of negotiation have different rhetorical purposes.

<6> Rhetoric and Composition scholars differ greatly on what they perceive as the rhetorical purpose of Rogerian argument. Much of this difference in perception is due in part to a primary source of Young, Becker and Pike's model of Rogerian argument. Their work depends heavily on the work of game theorist, Anatol Rapoport, in Fights, Games and Debates (1960). Rapoport argues that there are three methods to persuade, which have all been used in psychotherapy. These include the Pavlovian method, or brainwashing, which is based on rewards and punishment, the Freudian method, which Rapoport refers to as one that "explains an image away" (279), and the Rogerian method, in which the goal is to persuade by making the other feel understood, thereby reducing threat (273-88). Rapoport argues that the Rogerian method is the only promising one for "debates between equals" (274).

<7> In Rapoport's Fights, Games and Debates (1960), Rapoport essentially defines argument as persuasion. He asserts that "the removal of threat," which he claims is based on Rogers' technique of permissive therapy, is one way to persuade (286). He claims that his method is based on Rogerian psychology and is designed to help one modify an opponent's image. Rapoport presents this method as a means to help one to prevail over an opponent in an argument. Rapoport's method includes three components, from which Young, Becker and Pike adapt their steps of Rogerian argument. First, arguers must convey to opponents that they are understood, and then they must delineate the aspects of opponents' positions that are valid (287). These steps function by removing threat and enticing opponents to trust and listen to the debaters, who may then begin describing their positions to more receptive audiences.

<8> Based on Rapoport's model of Rogerian persuasion, Young, Becker and Pike explain that the theory of Rogerian argument, in Rhetoric: Discovery and Change (1970),

rests on the assumption that out of a need to preserve the stability of his image, a person will refuse to consider alternatives that he feels are threatening, and hence, that changing a person's image depends on eliminating this sense of threat. Much of men's resistance to logical argument seems explainable by this assumption. A strong sense of threat may render the reader immune to even the most carefully reasoned and well-supported argument. (274)

<9> The explicit goal of Young, Becker and Pike's model of Rogerian argument, then, is to reduce threat as a means of "changing a person's image." Although the word persuasion is not used here as it is by Rapoport, it is implicitly understood. Maxine Hairston in "Carl Rogers's Alternative to Traditional Rhetoric" (1976) also links Rogerian argument with persuasion. She interprets the "basic premise" of Rogers' seminal article, "Communication: Its Blocking and its Facilitation" as "you do not convert people to your point of view by threatening them or challenging their values" (373). The logical conclusion to this statement is that you may be able to convert people to your point of view by finding a method that is not threatening to them or challenging of their values. Hairston asserts that this insight has "profound implications for rhetoric" and that "any theory of persuasion must take it into account" (373). Although Hairston, Young, Becker and Pike take for granted that Rogers' theories are appropriate for use by rhetoricians as a means to persuade, this is not the case. In fact, it may be antithetical to Rogers' ideas to use Rogerian theory to persuade.

<10> In an interview with Nathaniel Teich, Rogers insists that the use of his ideas "for the purpose of winning an argument or changing the other person's mind" is not only "quite the opposite" of his thinking, but he continues, "I also regard it as a perversion of my thinking" (Conversation 55). One important way that the discipline of Rhetoric can re-imagine Rogerian rhetoric so that it can be a viable communication theory for the twenty-first century is to separate it from persuasion.

<11> Several rhetorical scholars have recognized that it is a misrepresentation of Rogers' theories to link them to a theory of persuasion. Diane Mader, in "What Are They Doing to Carl Rogers?" (1980), questions whether Rogerian argument can indeed be viewed as "argument," or as the "new persuasion," because she claims "the rationale for the Rogerian method is to minimize both argument and strategy" (314). In "Is Rogerian Rhetoric Really Rogerian" (1984), Lisa Ede was one of the first scholars to assert that "Rogerian rhetoric represents a distortion of Carl Rogers' own principles" (40). To re-envision Rogerian rhetoric so that it is more true to its source, Carl Rogers, rhetorical scholars should maintain the spirit of Rogerian philosophy that Young, Becker and Pike valued so highly, and at the same time reject those aspects of their work, in Rhetoric: Discovery and Change, that are inconsistent with that philosophy. Even Young admits there are some problems with their model of Rogerian argument. However, he cautions readers that it "would be a mistake" to reject Rogerian argument outright because their "effort to realize it may have been flawed" (110).

<12> It is difficult to define Rogerian argument as a theory of argument that does not involve persuasion because many experts define argument as being practically synonymous with persuasion. For instance, the authors of one contemporary argument textbook, Sylvan Barnet and Hugo Bedau, define argument as a subset of persuasion in Critical Thinking, Reading and Writing (2002, 4th ed.). According to this definition of argument, all argument is persuasion, but there are types of persuasion that are not considered argument: "Persuasion has the broader meaning. To persuade is to win over -- whether by giving reasons (that is, by argument) or by appealing to the emotions, or, for that matter, by using torture. Argument, one form of persuasion, relies on reason; it offers statements as reasons for other statements" (59). Similarly, Lester Faigley and Jack Seltzer, in Good Reasons with Contemporary Arguments (2003), present argument as an "attempt to change people's minds by convincing them of the validity of new ideas or that a particular course of action is the best one to take" (2). When so many authors of argument textbooks present argument as persuasion, it is not surprising that many also misrepresent the theory of Rogerian argument by defining it essentially as persuasion as well. Although the dominant paradigm in Rhetoric and Composition is that argument is a type of persuasion, alternative definitions are available that would allow Rogerian argument to be placed more in line theoretically with Rogers' philosophy.

<13> In John T. Gage's article, "The Reasoned Thesis" (1996), he argues it is imperative that we begin "unlinking argument from persuasion" in order to focus on other more important rhetorical goals (5):

Students who believe that they are being taught to argue to prevail over opponents in situations of conflict may believe in consequence that this end justifies any rhetorical practice that leads to winning over or silencing another. Indeed, one may find many advocates of such a success model for rhetorical proficiency, especially in textbooks. But it is not the only model, and any -- even casual -- linking of argument with persuasion detracts from the potential advantages of seeing cooperation rather than victory as the goal of rhetorical activity and competence. Perhaps by unlinking argument from persuasion we can focus attention on the need to teach argumentative writing as part of an education that foregrounds respect and consideration of the ideas of others. (5)

Gage's philosophy of argument is somewhat similar to that of Tannen. Rhetorical goals that are as important to us today as persuasion or defeating an opponent, such as maintaining dialogue, attempting to cooperate, learning to understand others, or making an effort to negotiate, are not adequately addressed, as Gage astutely observes, in contemporary argument textbooks. Teaching Rogerian argument could be one means of helping to foreground rhetorical goals other than persuasion. However, only roughly half of argument textbooks include any discussion of Rogerian argument at all, and many of the textbooks that do cover Rogerian argument do not adequately separate it from persuasion. There is a model of argument in the history of rhetoric other than persuasion from which we can draw in order to help us carve out a place for Rogerian argument.

<14> Jack Meiland, in "Argument as Inquiry and Argument as Persuasion" (1989), finds problems with the dominant paradigm of argument as persuasion in the teaching of Composition. He asserts that "although persuasion is a purpose of argumentation on some occasions, we must recognize that argumentation can and does have another and equally important purpose, namely inquiry. One reason why this point is important is that argumentation for purposes of inquiry often takes a different form from argumentation for persuasion" (185). One reason why Meiland believes it is so important to also emphasize argument as inquiry in our teaching of composition is that if we do not, we are giving students the wrong impression about what occurs in academia and about what their education is all about:

If our students are taught in high school that the purpose of argumentation is persuasion, then when they enter college and find that argumentation occurs all the time at the university level, they have no choice but to assume that their college teachers who present them with arguments are trying to persuade the students. And this gives a distorted picture of what, at least officially, goes on at the college level. What goes on at the college level, according to our official statements, is inquiry. (186)

Further, he claims by teaching argument as inquiry, we will "be placing a method of thinking of exceptional power in the hands of our students" (186).

<15> Argument for inquiry is more process-oriented than product-oriented, which is the case with argument for persuasion. It places more value on truth seeking rather than on being able to defend a position well, perhaps on either side of a debate. Argument for inquiry involves more tentative claims, and it requires more involvement from an audience than argument for persuasion. It is an attempt on the part of a speaker or writer to be a part of an ongoing conversation, a dialogue. Argument for inquiry shares many of the same qualities as Rogerian argument.

<16> John T. Gage, in "The Reasoned Thesis," argues that "our own search for an approach to argumentative writing that stresses inquiry over persuasion is hardly new" (7). For Gage, the "tension" between persuasion and inquiry has "motivated thinking about rhetoric from the beginning," and it is a problem across disciplines (7). Gage explains that the

problem is inherent in the nature of rhetoric itself: What is the relationship between the process of using language effectively and the process by which warranted belief is attained? Thus, anyone who is today interested in the relationship between writing and thinking is to some extent involved in a controversy that is permanently inscribed in the history of rhetoric. (7)

<17> Essentially, one of the most innovative and impressive discussions of Rogerian argument in current argument textbooks does not include the term "Rogerian argument" at all. In fact, Rogers is not even mentioned. Instead of Rogerian argument, "argument to negotiate" is presented as one of four primary aims of argument by Timothy Crusius and Carolyn Channel in The Aims of Argument (2003, 4th ed.). Even though they do not use the term "Rogerian argument," the manner in which argument to negotiate is presented is unmistakably Rogerianism at its best, and it is organized within a chapter entitled "Resolving Conflict: Arguing to Negotiate and Mediate." Some might define negotiation as similar to persuasion, just as some have defined Rogerian argument in that way; however, early in their chapter on negotiation, Crusius and Channel distinguish it from persuasion and define exactly what they are deeming negotiation:

[I]t is a mistake to think of negotiation as the same thing as negotiating the price of a car or a house or even a collective bargaining agreement. In a dialogue between a buyer and seller, both sides typically begin by asking for much more than they seriously hope to get, and the process involves displays of will and power as each side tries to force the other to back down on its demands. Negotiation as rhetorical argument, however, is less adversarial; in fact, it is more like collaborative problem-solving, in which various opposing parties work together not to rebut one another's arguments but to understand them. (295)

For Crusius and Channell, negotiation as rhetorical argument shares all the same qualities of the best models of Rogerian argument. It is collaborative rather than adversarial, and with it, opposing parties work to understand each other and to problemsolve rather than to win an argument.

<18> It is important that Crusius and Channell differentiate between the type of negotiation as rhetorical argument that they are focusing on and the type of negotiation as persuasion that even some negotiation experts discuss. They also explain that what they refer to as argument to negotiate shares many of the same qualities with another of their four aims -- argument to inquire. Both take the form of dialogue, and as with inquiry, negotiators "must inquire into the positions of all sides" (294). Similarly, negotiators and inquirers must acknowledge their own biases and "remain open to the positions and interests of others" (294). Crusius and Channell assert that inquiry and negotiation differ in that with negotiation, a compromise position must be found that "accommodates at least some of the interests of all sides" (294). Crusius and Channell's aims, argument to negotiate and argument to inquire, share as many similarities as do their other two aims, argument to convince and argument to persuade. They argue that the difference between argument to convince and to persuade is that a convincer uses appeals to reason, whereas persuaders appeal to reason and to the readers' emotions, to the writer's character, and to style (251). It may be helpful for students to differentiate between four aims of argument in this way, but Crusius and Channell admit in their preface that their doing so has brought forth many questions from instructors regarding whether such distinction is really necessary. They assert that although they believe there are advantages to teaching each of these aims of argument separately, individual instructors may decide not to teach one or some of the aims that way. My main argument also concerns making distinctions between the different goals of argument. For the purposes here, the goals of argument to inquire and argument to negotiate are similar in many ways, and both are consistent in many ways with the goals of Rogerian argument as it should be depicted; therefore, whereas it is important to distinguish Rogerian argument from persuasion, it is helpful to think of it as akin to both argument to inquire and argument to negotiate.

<19> At this point, it is necessary to present a definition of Rogerian argument that is more consistent with Rogers' theories than definitions that either explicitly or implicitly link it with persuasion. Rogerian argument is argument in which the speaker's or writer's primary goal to understand and to demonstrate understanding of the positions of others supersedes the goals of traditional argument, to support and to defend a position of one's own. With Rogerian argument, speakers or writers attempt to find common ground and establish trust. Writers and speakers of Rogerian argument can function both as mediators who work to facilitate understanding between two opposing groups or persons, or they can function as persons or members of a group who work to facilitate understanding with opposing persons or groups. Rogerian argument is not a strategy one intentionally uses to persuade another to one's point of view. That is a goal more consistent with traditional argument. Instead, Rogerian argument is a process of discovery, in which the goal is to participate in a dialogue, not to defeat an opponent. When successful, this type of argument should bring about change for all sides, not only in the audience, but also in the speaker, writer, or mediator, and it can help to bridge boundaries between participants. This is a definition that separates Rogerian argument from persuasion, and it can be thought of as akin to argument to negotiate or argument to inquire.

<20> Rogerian argument as rhetorical negotiation is different from the type of negotiation that might occur in the game Diplomacy, in which the object is for players to dominate Europe; however, games such as Diplomacy represent the values and the thinking of an earlier time. It requires players to use a style of communication, or a style of argument, that is not consistent with our needs in the twenty-first century. Rhetorical purposes that more accurately reflect twenty-first century needs must help citizens in a global culture to understand and coexist peacefully with others who are culturally different rather than to try to dominate and destroy them. Dialogue, negotiation, and difference must be valued over debate, persuasion and similarity. In the twenty-first century, it is dangerous not to insist upon a change in our argument culture. It is evident from an article Rogers wrote late in his life, entitled "One Alternative to Nuclear Planetary Suicide," that he also clearly believed this:

It needs to be recognized that, in the last analysis, it is not nuclear arms which pose the threat. A missile resting in its silo is not a threat. It is the intercultural and international feuds, the hatreds between groups, the religious animosities, the interracial bitterness, the hostile feelings of the "have-nots" toward the "haves." It is these social tensions which endanger us, since any one of them might trigger a nuclear war. (Rogers and Ryback 35)

Although Rogers wrote these words nearly twenty years ago in 1984, close to the end of the Cold War, his words seem almost more fitting for our own time. In the wake of the terrorist attacks that led to nearly 3,000 deaths, the destruction of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and four jetliners, Rogers' words about the dangers of the hatred between those of different cultures, creeds and economic situations are profoundly meaningful. Unfortunately, in our time when Rogerian rhetoric is urgently needed, it has not received the attention it deserves. Since the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, citizens of many nations realize how interconnected their situations are with those in other parts of the world. The act of ignoring the oppressive economic and social conditions of distant neighbors, such as those in Afghanistan, may give rise to horrible acts of terrorism. It is an example of how left unchecked, the hostility of the "have-nots" toward the "haves," to which Rogers alludes, is more dangerous than any weapon. In the twenty-first century, Rogerian rhetoric may be the most appropriate means for bridging intercultural boundaries, for building common ground, and for dealing with groups who bitterly hate one another.

Works Cited

Barnet, Sylvan, and Hugo Bedau. Critical Thinking, Reading and Writing: A Brief Guide to Argument. 4th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002. Crusius, Timothy, and Carolyn E. Channell. The Aims of Argument. 4th ed. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield, 2003.

Ede, Lisa. "Is Rogerian Rhetoric Really Rogerian?" Rhetoric Review 3.1 (1984): 40-48.

Faigley, Lester, and Jack Seltzer. Good Reasons with Contemporary Arguments. 2nd ed. New York: Allyn & Bacon, 2003.

Gage, John T. "The Reasoned Thesis." Argument Revisited; Argument Redefined. Ed. Barbara Emmel, Paula Resch, and Deborah Tenney. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996.

Hairston, Maxine. A Contemporary Rhetoric. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986.

Mader, Diane C. "What Are They Doing To Carl Rogers?" A Review of General Semantics 37 (1980): 314-19.

Meiland, Jack W. "Argument as Inquiry and Argument as Persuasion." Argumentation 3 (1989): 185-96.

Rapoport, Anatol. Fights, Games, and Debate. Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press, 1961. 245-309.

Rogers, Carl Ransom. A Way of Being. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980.

---, and David Ryback. "One Alternative to Nuclear Planetary Suicide" (1984)."Teich, Rogerian Perspectives 35-54.

Tannen, Deborah. The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue. New York: Random House, 1998.

Teich, Nathaniel, Ed. "Conversation with Carl Rogers." Teich, Rogerian Perspectives 55-64.

---, Ed. Rogerian Perspectives: Collaborative Rhetoric for Oral and Written Communication. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1992.

Young, Richard E., Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike. Rhetoric: Discovery and Change. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970.