Reconstruction 5.1 (Winter 2005)


Return to Contents »


Reading Owen's Between Reason and History: Habermas and the idea of Progress / Ali Rizvi [*]


<1> From the start Habermas' work has been an attempt at synthesising certain core insights from Kant and Hegel, as it is clearly evident from the beginning chapters of his first major work Knowledge and Human Interest (KHI). In the structure of the book Marx's position is as the mediator of Kant and Hegel and all subsequent authors are considered in order to overcome the shortcomings of this Marxian mediation (KHI: chapter 1-11, Habermas, 1982: 239ff Cf. Kortian, 1980).

<2> In post KHI writings this 'synthetic' approach has been lost to many commentators not necessarily due to a fault of their own. One reason being Habermas' increasing emphasis on the Kantian side of his synthesis (Formal pragmatics and theory of communicative action) and his relative negligence (since Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) and onward) of the Hegelian side of his project (theory of social evolution among other themes) [1].

<3> David S. Owen has done a splendid work through not only reconstructing the Hegelian side of Habermas' work (theory of social evolution) but also showing its relation (hence its synthetic potential) with the Kantian side of his work (formal pragmatics and theory of communication). To be sure Owen himself does not use Kantian and Hegelian references in this context [2] and simply defines his problematic with reference to the relation between the formal and historical side of Habermas' work. However I have chosen Hegelian and Kantian references in order to indicate the general significance of the study beyond its own self-understanding. Owen's is a balanced and sympathetic reconstruction of Habermas' theory of evolution, which also indicates lines of possible criticism. The study consists of five chapters.

<4> Owen (2002: Chapter 1) clearly defines the problematic of critical theory in general in the following: "If the way that we, as thinking and acting beings, relate to the subjective, the social, and the objective worlds is unavoidably conditioned by our sociohistorical contexts, then how can we posit a moral point of view that escapes the relativism and historicism that seem to follow from this fact?" (19). The problem is "one of justifying the standpoint of the social critic within history, that is without appealing to ahistorical, transcendental groundings" (ibid.). Thus the problem is clearly of escaping relativism and historicism (Kant) without denying the historical origin of our existence and thought (Hegel). Thus the problem concerns a Kantian/ Hegelian synthesis even if Owen does not explicitly define it in such terms.

<5> Chapter 2 is a concise and lucid introduction to Habermas' conception of critical theory. According to Owen "Habermas' conception of critical social theory consists of two theoretical dimensions or frameworks: the synchronic and the diachronic" (32). The synchronic element is represented by the formal pragmatics and the theory of communication while the diachronic element is represented by the theory of social evolution.

<6> The synchronic aspect of the theory defines its breadth. It defines its stretch and referent by "reconstruct(ing) the universal features of language use that are intuitively known by all competent speakers" (ibid.). Thus the theory intends to include through this all adult speakers of all human societies. But as Owen explains it is not sufficient since "Hegel impressed upon us the need to give an account of the historical character of consciousness. For this reason, the theory of communicative action needs to be complemented by an explanation of how these structures or competencies can change in the course of history" (ibid. emphasis added). The theory of evolution is seen as tracing the historical evolvement of those structures or competencies that formal pragmatics describes as universal features of language use. But the difficulty presents itself readily: if the structures historically evolve then in what sense can they be described as universal? [3]

<7> Moreover Owen's account of the relationship between the synchronic and the diachronic elements seems to be confused and inconsistent. Apart from the above account we find the following explanation, which seems to be incompatible with the above explanation. Here Owen describes this relation not in terms of horizontal and vertical aspects of the formal competences but in terms of formal and substantive rationalities. According to this account while the theory of communicative action establishes the formal conditions of rationality, the theory of evolution tries to answer on what basis we can adjudicate between different substantive reasons. As Owen puts it:

The theory of communicative action informs us what the formal conditions of a rational claim are, but it does not say anything about the sorts of contents (that is, reasons) that are acceptable in rational argumentation in a given context. Some reasons are unacceptable, not because they violate the formal conditions of discourse, but because they are simply implausible in the given discursive situation. One might ask, Why should the standards of good reasons peculiar to modern forms of consciousness be taken as the normative standard for us moderns? What makes good reasons in the modern era superior (if indeed they are) to good reasons of the premodern era? Answering precisely these sorts of questions is the aim of Habermas' theory of social evolution. (51, emphasis added).

So how does the theory of social evolution answer these questions? To answer this question we need to introduce the concept of lifeworld, which provides the bridge between the two axes of Habermas' theory. The concept of lifeworld provides the context in which communicative action works. It is "a necessary condition of intersubjective understanding as such" (45) in the Kantian sense.

<8> But the concept of lifeworld has similarities as well as differences with Kant's concept of the realm of pure intelligibility. The similarity is of course that both concepts form the horizon of and the limit of understanding. Another similarity is that they both have an anonymous character [4]. Thus, although they are the condition of knowledge they cannot themselves become the object of knowledge [5]. However at this point Habermas' conception of 'lifeworld' diverges from its counterpart in Kant in a substantial way.

<9> Although lifeworld as a whole cannot become the object of knowledge it can be partially thematised and objectivised. Through this partial thematisation and objectivisation lifeworld is reproduced and redefined. Thus as against Kant, for Habermas, the background of understanding is dynamic. Since for Habermas the medium of understanding is language, lifeworld is essentially reproduced linguistically. However lifeworld is never reproduced in toto. It remains an ever receding background which defies all attempts at complete articulation (Habermas, 1998b, TCA II: 113-152).

<10> The relationship between communicative understanding and its background is two way and not just one way as is in Kant. As against Kant where the background understanding remains unaffected by the data provided by senses in the case of Habermas the background is itself reproduced by the accomplishments of actors partially determined by it. Again another and perhaps most important difference is that as against Kant's conception of pure intelligibility Habermas' conception of lifeworld is not merely 'ideal' and 'rational,' on the contrary 'ideality' and 'facticity' are intertwined in it (BFN: Chapter 1). It would seem that at last the gulf between the realm of intelligibility and sensibility has been overcome. In the above-mentioned divergence from Kant Habermas' version of lifeworld resembles Hegel's conception of Spirit (Habermas, 1974: 146f).

<11> The concept of lifeworld is an essential ingredient of Habermas' formal pragmatics. But though it is an essential element of the formal pragmatics it is itself not a (purely) formal concept. Lifeworld is a substantive and concrete concept as well. Lifeworld provides the concrete grounding to the abstract grid of formal pragmatics. It is the repository of 'reasons' of which Owen speaks in the above quoted passage. It is the lifeworld and its particular constellation at a given time, which decides for us, according to Habermas, which reasons are plausible and which are not in the given historical period, and combined with the formal grid of formal pragmatics, which is universal, it forms the overall historical rational grid of a particular era.

<12> However to say that lifeworld is not a formal concept is not to deny its formal side. The concept of lifeworld has two angles to it. On the one hand it is a universal concept in the sense that it is the conditions of the possibility of intersubjective understanding. On the other hand it is a concrete concept, which varies from society to society (i.e. horizontally) and historically (i.e. vertically), in its particular constitutions. Thus lifeworld has both horizontal and vertical dimensions to it. Horizontally speaking lifeworld is the formal (general) condition of all forms of mutual understanding and hence a constant supplement to the formal pragmatics. However it is compatible with Habermas' belief that lifeworld in its concrete forms changes and varies both vertically and horizontally.

<13> Habermas deals with the formal side of the conception of lifeworld in two distinct ways. On the one hand the formal concept of lifeworld is the conditions of the possibility of mutual understanding and in this sense is part and parcel of his formal pragmatics. This sort of formality of lifeworld may be termed 'static formality'. On the other hand he also tries to determine the formal structures across the synchronic and diachronic variations in different specific lifeworlds. This may be termed as the dynamic formality. Habermas' discussion of decentration and rationalisation of lifeworld belongs to the latter (see Flunter, 2001). Habermas' theory of social evolution deals exclusively with the latter while the former belongs to his formal pragmatics. While the former cannot be thematized and must remain an ever receding background, the latter can be thematized and objectivised partially (Cf. Habermas, 1998b and Flunter, 2001).

<14> It is perhaps due to this double role that the concept of lifeworld is best suited to mediate between the formal world of Habermas' synchronistic communicative theory and the concrete world of his diachronistic theory of social evolution. Its formality links it with the theory of communication while its concreteness links it with the theory of evolution [6].

<15> Perhaps now we are in a position to try to resolve the apparent contradiction, which we encountered above in Owen's two distinct articulations of the relation between the two axes of Habermas' theory.

<16> The first formulation would mean that although the universal structures of communication are described by the theory of communicative action and formal pragmatics, the objective conditions of the realisation and recognition of these universal structures is described by the theory of social evolution. The theory of evolution describes the conditions and their progression in which the recognition of the rationality potential described in the theory of communicative action becomes possible. What is counted as rational is defined by the theory of communicative action while the theory of evolution explains the level of recognition (and realisation) of these standards at a given historical point.

<17> Thus in the first formulation the evolution of competencies should not be seen as the evolution of competencies as such (which would be contrary to the assumption of the universality of communicative competencies) but the evolution of the social and material conditions necessary for the self consciousness or recognition (and actuation) of those competencies. Habermas speaks of communicative competencies being the outcome of learning process (see Habermas, 1998a: 41). I take him to mean that the recognition and actuation of those competencies is the outcome of learning process and not competencies as such [7]. This is in tune with what Habermas himself alluded to in an interview:

Marx established in what sense the category of labour is a universal concept applicable to all societies. He shows that only to the extent that the capitalist mode of production has become established are the objective conditions fulfilled that allow him, Marx, access to an understanding of the universal character of this category 'labour'.

With regard to . . . a theory of communication, one must use the same method to clarify how the development of late capitalism has objectively fulfilled conditions that allow us to recognize universals in the structures of linguistic communication, providing criteria for a critique which can no longer be based on the philosophy of history (Habermas, 1986: 99).

Historically evolved objective conditions need to be fulfilled before the universal structures of linguistic communication can be 'recognized,' that is known explicitly and reflectively, and hence realised Thus the evolution, which the diachronic side of Habermas' theory tries to trace, is the evolution of the objective conditions, which make the recognition (and realisation) of the universal structures of communication possible.

<18> What are those objective conditions that must be fulfilled in order that the rationality potential of the universal structures of linguistic communications can be released? Habermas describes these conditions through his conception of decentration and rationalisation of the lifeworld. Here it is important to realise that Habermas describes the objective conditions for the realisation of the universal structures of linguistic communication in structural and formal terms. Thus he asserts that the decentration and rationalisation of lifeworld is structural and not substantive. Furthermore his theory of evolution is concerned with pointing out developmental logic in the rationalisation of lifeworld and does not deal with this or that lifeworld in particular. Thus Owen's characterisation of theory of evolution as 'concrete' is wrong in any straightforward sense.

<19> The second formulation can be explained as follows: while the theory of evolution deals with the field that provides 'reasons' (i.e. lifeworld), the theory of communication circumscribes their rationality. Thus the theory of evolution 'adjudicates' between the rationality levels of the 'reasons' of different historical periods and even within the same period by determining to what extent they realise the objective conditions that make the realisation of the universal structures of rationality possible. However if the standard of rationality is provided by the theory of communication, which is a formal theory, the adjudication process described by the theory of evolution can also be only formal and structural (and ultimately derived from the theory of communicative action).

<20> The above explanation provides the key to understanding why despite dealing with what is concrete, the theory of evolution itself is only interested in what is structural and formal aspects of it. What is accepted as a 'good reason' and rationally plausible at a given time is determined by the rationality of the structures of lifeworld [8] where concrete reasons are ultimately situated. The theory of evolution can answer such a question as "Why should the standards of good reasons peculiar to modern forms of consciousness be taken as the normative standard for us moderns" [9] only because it explains that modern lifeworld has realised the rationality potential more than pervious lifeworlds (i.e. lifeworld structures have been 'rationalised' more than the previous lifeworlds). Through discovering structural similarities between the modern lifeworld and the universal structures defined by the formal pragmatics it claims that the modern lifeworld is more rational than the previous ones and that the 'reasons' belonging to and emanating from this lifeworld are more 'rational' than the previous ones (Owen, 47).

<21> Thus the second of Owen's formulations though correct is ambiguous in the sense that though the theory of evolution deals with the concrete element it does so only in an indirect way. The theory of communicative action is a formal theory in the sense that it gives a general criterion to distinguish good reasons from bad reasons. The criterion is the following: ". . . good reasons are thought to be good only when they are acceptable to the participants in a rational discourse" (51). The theory of communicative action defines the formal conditions, which are necessary if a rational discourse is to be established. However the theory of communicative action does not provide the actual reasons those participants in the discourse use [10]. Those reasons come from the socio cultural milieu (the lifeworld) in which the participants are situated. And the rationality of those 'reasons' would depend to the extent that the lifeworld concerned have been 'rationally' developed (rationalised in Habermas' jargon) [11]. And this is the domain of Habermas' theory of evolution. However the process of the rationalisation of the lifeworld itself is structural and formal. Thus the theory of social evolution adjudicates between competing substantive reasons to the extent that it declares that a particular lifeworld has been rationalised and hence in it the rationally potential of communicative actions has been released as against the others. Thus in answer to the question "What makes good reasons in the modern era superior (if indeed they are) to good reasons of the premodern era?," the theory of evolution can point towards the rationalisation of lifeworld in the modern era as against premodern eras. The answer would consist in comparing the structures of the two lifeworlds in question. This would yield the answer to the question of what makes 'reasons' emanating from the rationalised lifeworld more rational than the others, which is a substantive question. Thus Habermas, on the face of it at least, is successful in dealing the question of concreteness and substance without compromising the formality of this theory [12].

<22> Although Owen does not make explicit the apparent tension in his two formulations and hence does not try to reconcile them at the explicit level as we have tried above, his account contains such an answer and its essential elements. The potential answer is provided in the next two chapters.

<23> Chapter 3 is essentially aimed at clearing and distinguishing the meaning of certain key concepts that involve any account of Habermas' theory of social evolution. It also considers and clarifies briefly methodological issues involved. On the conceptual level Owen clarifies the distinction between key concepts such as evolution, social evolution, development, and progress. Owen's masterful distinctions can be summarised briefly in his own words:

"Social change" refers to qualitative changes in the behaviour of social agents as members of a group, or changes in the organisation of social structures that condition social action, or changes in fundamental attitudes of social agents with respect to their environments. "Development" refers to teleological social change metaphorically understood as the gradual unfolding of an inherent potential. "Social evolution" that exhibits a direction (according to some criterion) and that is continuous and gradual and not discontinuous or abrupt. "Progress" refers to any directional social change that is favourably evaluated according to a criterion of value (Owen, 2002: 76).

These are certainly important and on the whole correctly formulated distinctions. However there are certain ambiguities present here, which should, at least, be identified. The concept of social change as defined by Owen is insufficiently nuanced to capture what Habermas is aiming at in his theory of social evolution. Maeve Cooke has recently distinguished between three levels of learning and the kind of transformation accompanying them: technical, personal and socio cultural learning (Cooke, 2002: 83ff). The essential distinction, which is pertinent to our discussion, is between the transformation occurring within the 'prevailing standards' (either on an individual or group level) and "transformation of the very standards". The first kind of learning is termed by Cooke as personal and includes learning and transformation at both individual and group levels. The second kind of learning and transformation is termed by Cooke as socio cultural learning and transformation. Habermas' theory of social evolution deals essentially with the second kind of learning and transformation.

<24> Although Owen indicates this through referring to 'qualitative' changes and in his further emphasis on the Habermasian distinction between surface changes and changes in deep structures (Owen, 2002: 79-82), I think he does not make sufficiently clear the distinction between learning and transformation at the personal level and social level (in Cooke's sense). Habermas' theory of social evolution is (primarily) not about changes at the personal level, it only concerns the socio cultural transformation in Cooke's sense. In terms of Owen's above distinctions it traces the patterns and logic in changes in the very 'standards' on which a society is based. And since Habermas believes that these changes are developmental in their nature, Habermas' theory of social evolution concerns itself with tracing the developmental patterns in changes that the fundamental standards of societies go through.

<25> Naturally the main chapter of the book (chapter 4) deals with the concept of developmental logic, as it is essential for understanding Habermas' social evolution theory and also for understanding the relation between his theory of social evolution and communicative action. Since Habermas' notion of developmental logic is largely based on Piaget's developmental psychology, Owen first clarifies the concept of developmental logic and various elements, which constitute it, with reference to Piaget's developmental logic. In this impressive and detailed reconstruction Owen tries to develop a coherent understanding of the concept of developmental logic and its constituent elements. Then he briefly shows the relevance of this in understanding Habermas' use of it in his theory of evolution.

<26> Owen then goes on to explicitly discuss what Habermas' developmental thesis is all about. He does this both with reference to his early and mature work. With reference to his early work Owen introduces the problem in terms of the well known homological argument. It is argued that since for Habermas the structures of the possibility of intersubjective understanding are the conditions of both personality systems as well as social systems we can discern certain similarities and parallels between development in personality systems and social systems. This approach seems particularly attractive since it is believed that in a certain sense Piaget has already established that there is a developmental pattern in changes in the standards that constitute personality structures. Thus if we can establish that there is a similar pattern to developments at the social level we would have a strong reason to attribute these developmental patterns to the structures which are the conditions of the possibility of both personality and social systems (ibid: 144).

<27> The standard argument against Habermas' earlier construction has been that it commits what has been termed as ontogenetic fallacy. Owen rejects this objection on the basis that Habermas does not presume an analogy between personality structures and social structures but only a homology and there is a difference between analogy and homology (153-154). The response is appropriate to a certain extent given Owen's earlier careful qualifications regarding similarities and distinctions between developmental concepts in a psychological theoretic sense and a social theoretic sense. However Owen concedes that the argument is not very promising for other reasons, namely it relies too much on what is empirical and changeable (ibid: 156).

<28> This brings us to the description and consideration of Habermas' "developmental logic thesis on grounds other than homological thesis" (ibid: 158). Habermas' mature work traces the developmental logic through the key concept of the rationalisation of the lifeworld. Lifeworld is rationalised to the extent that it fulfils the conditions necessary for the release of the rationality potential inherent in linguistic communication. The criterion for rationality, that is what it means to be rational, is decided by the formal pragmatics (ibid: 160). The rationalisation of the lifeworld would be said to have 'direction' to the extent that it is realising this rationality potential in a cumulative manner. We would attribute 'necessity' to this directional change to the extent that any reversion from the current stage to the previous one would be counted as regression in the normative sense (indicating that the rationality criterion set by formal pragmatics is normative).

<29> Owen is right in a sense when he notes that "(t)he formal-pragmatic structure is reflected in the socio cultural lifeworld, because, in a sense, both communicative action and the lifeworld occupy the same intersubjective space" (ibid:159). However one must ask in what sense and to what extent? If the lifeworld is reproduced through communicative action then Owen is also right to interpret Habermas as claiming that "the communicative infrastructure of the sociocultural lifeworld is internally related to, and hence logically constrained by, the formal-pragmatic properties of communicative action" (ibid.). But as Owen rightly points out the 'constraint' is normative. In other words the formal pragmatics provide the criterion to assess and gauge the rationality of the lifeworld. However one must add that even this normative 'constraint' would cover a tiny 'segment' and never the lifeworld as a whole because, as Habermas sees it, we are as a rule only in contact with the tiny portion of lifeworld and never with the lifeworld as a whole.

<30> Then what is the rationality criterion carved out by formal pragmatics? I wish to revamp this review by discussing briefly this crucial issue. According to Owen "the unavoidable raising of criticisable validity claims in communicative actions possesses a rational potential-the potential of communicative rationality" (ibid: 160). Thus, the possibility of questioning the existing validity claims and the possibility of suggesting an alternative to existing validity claims, in sum the possibility of taking a yes/no position vis a vis validity claims, is what constitutes the rational potential of the communicative practices. This is to be supplemented by another criterion which is related to Habermas' theory of evolution: "(a)rgumentation makes possible behaviour that counts as rational in a specific sense, namely learning from explicit mistakes" (TCA 1: 22, quoted in Owen: 160). So presumably learning through argumentation is seen as rational and the necessary conditions of the possibility of argumentation would constitute the conditions of rationality. Learning from mistakes implies for Habermas learning in a cumulative manner and forms the basis of his developmental thesis.

<31> But this is too thin a criterion of rationality to be of any use. It is hard to find any human society horizontally or vertically, which did not possess the capacity to learn and which did not use argumentation as a means to learning. Of course societies have different capacities horizontally and vertically and also different existing stocks of learning, but all this is factual, and cannot be decisive for the normative question of rationality. The breadth or depth or potential for either cannot be considered as constitutive of rationality. If we are to consider the criterion of rationality as a mere possibility of learning through argumentation (and mistakes) then it is too thin a conception of rationality to be of any use for deciding the substantive claims such as the possibility of moral progress in human history. Perhaps Habermas is arguing that "only" learning through argumentation is rational and other forms of learning are irrational. Societies may then be said to differ in terms of their learning through non-argumentation and non-discursive means. Maybe Habermas says argumentation should be the only means of learning. But I cannot pursue this line of thought further here.

<32> In fact there is a very substantive conception of rationality working in Habermas, which he tries to 'disguise' in the form of a thin conception of rationality mentioned above. It is clear from the way Habermas describes the concept of decentring. He tends to portray it as a 'descriptive' analysis (see for this comments in Dews, 1986: 184) but if one reads his description of the process of decentration in Europe (for example TCA II: 119-152) carefully one immediately realises that it is normative through and through and presupposes the validity of and desirability of the Enlightenment revolt against Christianity (thus basing his argument on suppositions which first need to be proved) [13].

<33> This is clear from such claims as the following: "Universal discourse points to an idealised lifeworld reproduced through processes of mutual understanding that have been largely detached from normative contexts and transferred over to rationally motivated yes/no positions. This sort of growing autonomy can come to pass only to the extent that the constraints of material reproduction no longer hide behind the mask of a rationally impenetrable, basic, normative consensus, that is to say behind the authority of the sacred. A lifeworld rationalised in this sense would by no means reproduce itself in conflict free forms. But the conflicts would appear in their own names; they would no longer by concealed by convictions immune from discursive examination" (TCA II: 145). In typical Enlightenment fashion Habermas tries to pretend that the overcoming of religious and sacred normativity would not create a new normativity and new authority. Obviously Habermas is here presupposing the whole worldview without proving it.

<34> Before proceeding to the conclusion stage of this paper it would be advisable to describe the precise meaning of the concept of 'decentration' in Habermas. Stephen White has described it well and it would be worthwhile to quote him here:

. . . decentration means that . . . a conceptual separation between the cognitive-technical, the moral, and the aesthetic dimensions, as well as a reflective attitude toward these dimensions. The evolutionary importance of this change (in the sense of an advance in rationality) is that it allows for self-critique and an awareness of alternative interpretations of the world in all three dimensions (White, 1984: 31).

I want to suggest that the criterion of rationality inherent in Habermas' formal pragmatics is that of the normative conception of decentring. Owen also alludes to this when he says that "Habermas argues that for both communicative action and sociocultural lifeworld an increase in rationality is constituted by a decentring of the ego centric perspective" (ibid: 161). In fact I want to suggest here that decentration is constitutive of the very concept of rationality in Habermas. This seems obvious from Owen's claim above as well since decentring cannot be considered as an increase in rationality unless it is constitutive of rationality. It is also seconded by a careful following of Habermas' argument and different moves within it.

<35> Thus the formal pragmatics purports to establish decentration as the conditions of the intersubjective understanding. The theory of evolution traces the history of societies establishing the objective conditions necessary for the release of this rationality potential. This process is described in terms of the rationalisation of lifeworld. In other words it is the history of the recognition of decentration as 'know that' of what according to Habermas has always been 'know how' of societies and its members throughout the history and realisation of the objective conditions for such a recognition. This second sort of enquiry is clearly an empirical enquiry in the sense that it purports to describe the patterns of recognition and fulfilment of objective conditions even if they need to be reconstructed.

<36> Following a strategy, which was pursued by Max Weber in a different context, Habermas notes the turn towards decentration with the arrival on the world stage of the world religions. But obviously, and here again following Max Weber's strategy, this turn remains incomplete until the advent of modernity. With the arrival of modernity we see the rationalisation of lifeworld itself whereby the authority of sacred and normative is totally replaced by the (non) authority of yes/no, the so-called force of the better argument. But there are two highly ambitious and ambiguous presuppositions that lie behind this argument, which should at least be mentioned here:

<37> Let me summarise and briefly assess Owen's overall position on the issues developed above:

<38> a) On the level of communicative action Habermas' analysis is valid. It does not rest on any form of eurocentrism and is based on 'an analysis of our every day communicative action' (ibid: 178). Owen claims that:

"(t)he burden of proof rests not on Habermas to demonstrate empirically that every known linguistic form of communication is susceptible to such analysis; rather, it rests on the critic, who must cite specific counterexamples in which the unavoidable presuppositions identified by Habermas are indeed not made. Until such an argument is made in detail, the charge of Eurocentrism (in the sense of logocentrism) cannot be taken seriously" (ibid.) [14]

Although in line with the general tendency of the study the harshness of the claim is in stark contrast with Owen's own earlier suggestion that the theory of communicative action might be interpreted on less universalistic lines (ibid: 161). However, despite its firmness and harshness the claim misses the point altogether. The question is not of finding counterexamples to Habermas' examples. The question is rather what does Habermas' examples prove? Habermas assumes that decentration and differentiation are sufficient to establish the criterion of rationality. But the problem is that Habermas assumes this and never proves it. Habermas does not answer, even does not address, the question of why decentration constitutes rationality and non-decentration and even anti-decentration irrationality. If it is claimed that the concept of decentration is merely a factual concept then it cannot prove much, it is a very thin conception. If on the other hand it is treated as a normative concept, as I think it is in Habermas, it first needs to be proved. It cannot provide the basis of justifying rationality without first being justified itself.

<39> In his Inaugural address of Frankfurt Habermas had claimed that "(t)he human interest in maturity (Mündigkeit) is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure, maturity is posited for us" (KHI: 314, translation amended). This bold assertion had caused a considerable stir at the time. Habermas' magnum opus TCA can be seen as an attempt to 'proving' this assertion. He tries to prove this assertion by showing how through language structures (through analysing the pragmatic communicative aspect of language) we must presuppose maturity (another name for decentration).

<40> But this is a fallacious argument because even if we grant Habermas all his moves it is not clear why decentration and differentiation, which Habermas regards as the conditions of intersubjective understanding, be regarded normatively. It is one thing to say that a certain form of distance ad infinitum towards self, other and nature is the basis of linguistic communication and it is another thing to say that expanding this distance is desirable (or even necessary beyond a certain point). The second simply does not follow from the first. Unless we define morality in terms of decentration and differentiation there is no way to establish the desirability of decentration. The notion of maturity which is a Kantian notion and a core Enlightenment belief involves substantive presuppositions about human beings and their status in this universe and cannot be established on the basis of a minimalist (proceduralist) rationality.

<41> Habermas' predecessors at the Frankfurt school especially Adorno and Horkheimer had realised long before that the Enlightenment equation of freedom and reason was erroneous (Rizvi, 2000). The same is the conclusion drawn by most postmodernist authors. The Enlightenment project of freedom can be regarded as rational only if we define rationality in its terms. It is far fetched to think that a minimalist concept of rationality can provide justification for the project of freedom.

<42> b) On the level of social evolution Owen thinks Habermas' account if applied across the board to all societies would incur the charge of eurocentrism, as there is not enough data and evidence to corroborate Habermas' claims (Owen, 2002:162). He rather suggests, "(in) my view, Habermas' developmental model of social evolution remains particularly promising if it foregoes the claim to universality; Instead of attempting to reconstruct a universal developmental logic it would be more plausible simply to reduce the scope of validity of the developmental to the sociocultural formation or form of life under investigation. In that case, it would be necessary to reconstruct the developmental logics for different sociocultural complexes and forms of life, but these would no longer claim universal validity" (ibid: 163). I think this is a reasonable suggestion since if Habermas' claim is restricted to modernity it can be shown then that societies that have espoused modernity in last few centuries have developed "within the developmental logical structures of an increasing decentration" (ibid: 162).

<43> c) And yet even when restricted to a particular sociocultural formation Owen insists that Habermas' theory of social evolution can be interpreted as 'progressive'. Owen had earlier defined the concept of progress as referring "to any directional change that is favourably evaluated according to a criterion of value" (ibid: 76). Habermas' developmental logic even when limited to a particular social formation would be seen as 'progressive' in the sense that it can lay down or point to the 'criterion of value' according to which each stage can be evaluated with reference to the previous stage. But the question here is still ambiguous as this 'criterion of value' can be seen as either particular to the specific social formation under consideration or generally applicable to all other social formations. If the first is the case then really the charge of eurocentrism can be avoided but if the second is the case even after limiting the developmental logic to Western history, the charge still remains. The charge of eurocentrism can only be warded off, if the 'criterion of value' were interpreted as strictly limited to the particular formation under consideration. But obviously it is not the position that Owen takes. Thus the limitation of developmental logic (b above) turns out to be a sham because the logic of developmental logic is not applied to non European societies out of any realisation for the fact that there may be other criterions of rationality superior to European ones but out of the consideration that they cannot be reconstructed as actually progressing towards those standards of rationality already enshrined by the theory of communicative action.

<44> This takes us back to the question from where we started. Does this reconstruction of the Hegelian side of the Habermasian synthesis throw any fresh light on Habermas' endeavours to synthesise Kant and Hegel? McCarthy summarises the basic thrust of Habermasian synthesis well:

Habermas agrees with Kant that reason and autonomy are the basic normative concepts of practical philosophy; but like Hegel he holds that they can be realised only in the ethical life of concrete historical communities. He wants to retain the normative, critical thrust of Kant's Moralität and integrate it with the historical, empirical dimensions of Hegel's Stittlichkeit. This is the point behind a communicative ethics (117).

[For Habermas as against Kant] inclinations need not be suppressed to insure that each individual is identical with the universal, precisely because the discourse model assumes different individual seeking to come to an agreement. Rational discourse includes talk about their differences. Any consensus arrived at on this basis will necessarily involve a mediation of a particular and the general, and not a suppression of the one for the other (118).

Fred Dallmayr doubts any such symbiosis altogether. As he puts it in his response to McCarthy's above statement: "there are reasons for doubting the feasibility of this symbiosis-of subscribing simultaneously (with Kant) to the a priori status of reason and autonomy and (with Hegel) to their embeddedness in historical settings" (126). The question is whether we can think of reason as embedded but still not exhausted by its embeddedness? This is in fact Habermas' intention in trying to synthesise Kant and Hegel. He wants to combine Kantian transcendence with Hegelian embeddedness but Dallmayr is right to note that "Habermas' approach (in my view) typically accentuates the Kantian over the Hegelian strands" (ibid.). I agree with Dallmayr's observation but it is not due to the improbability or impossibility of the task in any sense.

<45> What Habermas fails to do is to work out actual synthesis instead of juxtaposing elements from two sides. Even if we concede that Habermas has done some work towards it he has not been bold enough to think concepts anew to arrive at such a synthesis. The key to this synthesis is, I believe, to think anew the conception of transcendence historically. The key to this thinking anew in the words of Dallmayr is that, "in order to make sense of ethics, thinking must move beyond subject and object to domain antedating or overarching this split" (127).

<46> Certainly Owen's book does not attempt to reach in his analysis the level we are suggesting simply because he has been occupied with the exposition rather than critical evaluation. But through his brilliant analysis of the Hegelian side of Habermas' enterprise Owen has provided us a new opportunity to rethink the Habermasian synthesis and its viability in new radical terms.


Notes

[*] David Owen, Between Reason and History, Habermas and the idea of Progress (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002).[^]

[1] It is not the case that Habermas dropped the Hegelian side. However in the polemics in which Habermas increasingly engaged post TCA the Kantian side naturally got more emphasis and the limelight. [^]

[2] Apart from a few suggestive allusions here and there. [^]

[3] We will consider the implications of this rhetorical question shortly. [^]

[4] They are anonymous in the sense that they do not have a subject circumscribing them. There is no subject of lifeworld as there is no subject of pure intelligible realm in Kant. [^]

[5] Habermas alludes to the possible affinity between Kant's concept of the 'realm of intelligible' and his own concept of lifeworld and communicative practices in Habermas, 1998b: 240. [^]

[6] Although, as would become clear in the course of our exposition, it is highly problematic to dub the theory of communication as formal while the theory of evolution as concrete. [^]

[7] In other words it is not that language use has evolved into something which it was not. On the other hand the potential, always already present in language use, has been recognised and realised. So it is more the question of the realisation of the objective conditions in which the unleashing of the communicative potential inherent in language can become possible. [^]

[8] The level of rationalisation and decentration. [^]

[9] There is a crucial ambiguity here in the use of 'us moderns' as it can also be construed as 'us moderns alone'. I will exploit this ambiguity at the end to criticise Owen's suggested concessions to avoid eurocentrism of the theory of evolution. [^]

[10] And the theory of communicative action is formal only to this extent and not more than this. [^]

[11] And the theory of evolution is concrete only to this extent and not more than this. [^]

[12] Although the question of whether it can answer the question of plausibility is even more complex than the above. An argument can satisfy the condition of formality and still not be plausible to the extent that it emanates from a less rationalised lifeworld and has realised the objective conditions to a lesser extent. Thus Habermas' objection against world religions is not that they do not meet rationality conditions as such (in fact they pave the way for the modernity) but that lifeworld under their sway is only partially rationalised. [^]

[13] Habermas writes (for example) that, "(t)he religious forces of social integration grew weaker in the wake of a process of enlightenment that is just as little susceptible of being revoked as it was arbitrarily brought about in the first place. One feature of this enlightenment is the irreversibility of learning processes, which is based on the fact that insight cannot be forgotten at will; they can only be repressed or corrected by a better insight." (PDM: 84). However it does not follow from the principle that 'insights cannot be forgotten at will' that the question of previously held insights once overcome is settled for ever. [^]

[14] I found Owen's obsession with the issue of eurocentrism a bit excessive. As I think the more interesting criticism would not be aimed at Habermas' eurocentrism but against his espousal of modernity. Stephen K. White's account (White: 1984) is in this respect more perceptive. [^]


Works Cited

Barbara Fultner (2001) "Intelligibility and conflict resolution in the lifeworld" Continental Philosophy Review 34: 419-436.

Maeve Cooke (2002) "Argumentation and Transformation" Argumentation 16: 79-108.

Fred Dallmayr (1984) "Response To Comments On "Twilight Of Subjectivity" Philosophy and Social Criticism 10: 121-130.

Peter Dews ed. (1986) Autonomy and solidarity: interviews with Jürgen Habermas, edited and introduced by Peter Dews. (London: Verso)

Jürgen Habermas (1972), Knowledge and human interests translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Heinmenn).

Jürgen Habermas (1974) Theory and Practice translated by John Viertel ( London : Heinemann).

Jürgen Habermas (1974a), "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind" in Habermas (1974): 142-169.

Jürgen Habermas (1982) "A Reply to my Critics" in Habermas: critical debates edited by John B. Thompson and David Held (London: Macmillan, 1982).

Jürgen Habermas (c1984-1987) The theory of communicative action vol. i & ii, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press).

Jürgen Habermas (1998) On the pragmatics of communication edited by Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press).

Jürgen Habermas (1998a) "What is Universal Pragmatics" in Jürgen Habermas (1998).

Jürgen Habermas (1998b) "Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, and the Lifeworld" in Jürgen Habermas (1998).

Garbis Kortian (1980) Metacritique: The Philosophical Argument of Jürgen Habermas trans. John Raffan, with introduction by Charles Taylor and Alan Montefiore (Cambridge, CUP).

John B. Thompson and David Held (1982) Habermas: critical debates edited by (London: Macmillan).

Thomas McCarthy (1984) "Comments on "Twilight of Subjectivity" Philosophy and Social Criticism 10: 115-119.

Ali Rizvi (2000) "Adorno and Foucault on Enlightenment" Pakistan Business Review Vol. 2 No. 2 pp. 31-45.

Stephen K. White (1984) "Habermas' Communicative Ethics and the development of moral consciousness" Philosophy and Social Criticism 10: 25-48.


ISSN: 1547-4348. All material contained within this site is copyrighted by the identified author. If no author is identified in relation to content, that content is © Reconstruction, 2002-2016.