Reconstruction 6.3 (Summer 2006)
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Water, Development, and State Security in South Asia: Scenarios for China and India / Ray Chandrasekara and John M. Polimeni
Abstract: Conflict over water resources is rare and has not occurred for thousands of years. However, the dynamics in South Asia are changing so rapidly that a conflict in the not-so-near future may be unavoidable. Water shortages could have the nonlinear effects of food shortages, political instability, migration problems, and diminished economic growth. All of these factors, caused by water shortages, could be a driver of conflict in the region, causing territorial disputes. Global instability would be sure to follow as both the U.S., attempting to protect their national security interests, and China, reacting as the regional power, tries to intervene. Further complicating matters is the uncontrolled population growth and decline in public sanitation in South Asia. This paper presents two scenarios of what may occur and then provides a discussion of how the key stakeholders in the region are likely to react.
1. Overview
<1> Asia has always had a defining presence in world history.[1] There has not been a war in Asia strictly over water resources since the city-states of Lagash and Umma fought each other in the Tigris-Euphrates basin in 2500 B.C.[2] However, the dynamics of water supply and demands are changing in Asia and there is greater regional water scarcity. Population growth, rising standards of living, and expanded agricultural production all promise to continue to drive water consumption levels higher. Industrialization will continue to have a large negative effect on water supply as well as generating additional water demand in Asia. These changing dynamics of water supply and demand could cause water to become a catalyst, both directly and indirectly, for conflict in the region and for the formulation of national strategies over the next several decades.
<2> Water shortages could affect the strategic environment indirectly by weakening states economically, agriculturally, and demographically, thus shaping a strategic environment. A state deprived of access -- or otherwise unable to gain adequate access -- to water could experience severe economic contraction and serious threats to public health and agricultural production, even in very short periods of time. States are particularly vulnerable to water shortages in urban centers, where large populations and large industrial output depend upon centralized water distribution systems. Although these centralized water distribution systems are part of a states’ critical infrastructure, they do not receive the investment, maintenance and protection that they warrant. A natural or inflicted water shortage to an urban area could cause immediate social instability, public health hazards, and economic slow-downs. Trends of rural-to-urban migration will increase this vulnerability by concentrating more and more people in urban centers where they are dependent upon centralized water systems.
<3> A sustained lack of adequate access to water could constrain or distort economic growth and weaken a state’s demography by negatively affecting public health through poor levels of sanitation, contaminated drinking water supplies, and inadequate levels of nutrition due to reduced agricultural output. Such long-term effects of water shortages will tend to produce social stress on a society and create heavy administrative burdens on the state. Over time, water shortages will cause states to face problems such as large-scale rural-to-urban migration, urban unemployment, inequitable water allocation between economic groups, intersectoral competition for water resources between industries, and a softer tax revenue base. In certain situations, these long-term effects of water shortages could produce political tension and chronic, diffuse low-intensity domestic conflict. In these situations, water will rarely be a single driver in causing the domestic instability and conflict. Rather, water will tend to influence domestic stability as a factor embedded in a larger constellation of variables. Also, water will not always have a proximate effect on domestic stability, but will frequently indirectly influence domestic stability by generating a series of negative social effects. These social effects will tend to affect domestic stability especially in combination with other variables such as weak or ineffective state administrative power, weak or deteriorating regime legitimacy, declining levels of economic production, undemocratic or oligarchic governance, severe social and economic stratification, and environmental degradation.
<4> In some cases, water could have a direct and immediate effect on domestic stability by playing a catalytic role. In this capacity, water is also unlikely to act as a single variable, but may act as a driver that suddenly transforms a strategic environment that has been shaped over time by a larger constellation of variables. Acting as a catalyst, the effect of water on the strategic environment will tend to be very non-linear, with recurring incidents of small magnitude suddenly triggering a transformational event. A domestic environment characterized by social and economic inequities or ethnic tensions could be polarized or pushed into conflict by a contest over access to water supplies. In this capacity, water issues become a point of contention that aggravates pre-existing conditions. Such a situation may be occurring in urban India, where inadequate access to water among the urban poor has stoked resentment and violence.
<5> The fact that water will tend to act as a catalyst -- bringing change to a pre-existing situation, or as a shaper of a strategic environment, embedded and interacting with a series of other political, economic, and social variables -- will make it difficult to identify and analyze the relationship between water and international security. Although the relationship of water issues to instability and conflict is frequently not proximate or linear, this does not suggest, however, that these relationships are not robust or important. Rather, it suggests that the influence of water on international security is most likely underestimated.
<6> In the following sections, this paper will examine the dynamics that currently exist in South Asia that have the potential for conflict, as well as the social and economic conditions that are present that may lead to conflict. Section two presents the likely effects water scarcity will have in the region. Section three provides an overview of how water scarcity could lead to conflict, who the likely parties will be, and how U.S. security interests will be affected. Section four examines how China will behave as the regional power in South Asia. Section five presents alternative worlds -- two scenarios of what the authors believe is most likely to occur if water shortages strike the region. In section six the effects of water scarcity on population and public sanitation is explored. Section seven concludes the paper with a brief discussion.
2. The Effects of Water Scarcity
<7> Water will influence strategic environments through at least the 2050 time horizon in a number of key ways. First, water shortages will likely cause food shortages. States’ water policies will be heavily driven by their policies on food security and agricultural self-sufficiency, which in turn is closely linked to population growth. For example, it will be increasingly difficult for India and China to expand agricultural production quickly enough to feed rapidly growing populations. India will need to more than double its grain production from 200 million tons in 2000 to 450 million tons in 2050 to feed its population.[3] China’s agricultural dependence upon cultivation of high-calorie per hectare wheat in the arid north China plain, where groundwater supplies are over-exploited, will require expedited development of surface water transportation and delivery systems. If China and India are not able to provide enough water to keep pace with domestic food consumption, these countries will be forced to acquire increasingly large volumes of grain on international markets. If this transition to international grain markets is sudden, it could cause a global agricultural commodity shock that could cause grain prices to spike. This price shock would have a devastating effect on social stability in much of the developing world, where much of the population already spends more than half of its income on food.
<8> Second, water shortages could threaten political legitimacy. For example, the Chinese communist party’s legitimacy has come to rest heavily on nationalism and economic growth. Depending upon how much water impedes economic growth in China, the Chinese leadership could act coercively to rectify water supply and demand problems to avoid an erosion of regime legitimacy. To the extent that water is defined as a national resource in domestic Chinese politics and strategic thinking, Chinese nationalism could polarize the Chinese perspective on international negotiations over shared water resources in bilateral relationships with the countries of Southeast Asia, making China much less accommodating to the requirements of these countries. In the near to medium term, China’s centralized government may be better equipped to deal with the effects of water scarcity versus the other countries in South Asia. Over time and in certain contexts, however, water scarcity could substantially weaken the administrative power of China and states throughout South Asia, reducing the ability of these states to provide basis services to their citizens. Ultimately in some contexts, water scarcity could threaten the legitimacy of these governments and the integrity of these countries.
<9> Third, water scarcity will tend to influence the Asian strategic environment during this time frame primarily by creating what can be described broadly as chronic, diffuse, low-level but unmanageable sub-state conflict. These sub-state effects of water scarcity can be expected to spill-over into the international arena and invite or require U.S. military intervention. Likely spill-over areas include northeastern India and Bangladesh. Other countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam are likely to be affected.
<10> Fourth, water scarcity could generate large volumes of domestic and international migration as subsistence farmers who are unable to make a living on the land, either because of absolute water scarcity or because of increased water prices, move to urban areas in search of employment. As urban populations swell, this will cause increases in urban unemployment and pose enormous challenges to the administrative power of the state in terms of welfare, social services, and public health. In the case of China, the country has exhibited an acute sensitivity to unemployment and the potential social disruption that large scale unemployment could cause, as reflected in industrial and economic policies that seek to modernize the economy with minimum job loss. A rise in urban unemployment generated by rural to urban migration could cause Chinese industrial and economic policy to become more protectionist in an attempt to generate more employment within China. This could constrain further integration of China into the global economy causing migration to occur in north China, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia into northern India. This, in combination with other resource scarcities, could inflame regional separatist movements.
<11> Fifth, and related, water scarcity will tend to impede economic growth, both in the sectors of industry and agriculture. Given the preponderance of agriculture in most South Asian economies, disruptions in this sector will be the most critical. The greatest influence will be on the agricultural sector, which continues to comprise a major portion of most economies in South Asia. The success or failure of India and China to deal effectively with the results of water scarcity, could significantly affect current projections of economic growth in both of these countries, as economist Charles Wolf has noted.[4] Under several scenarios, the effect of water scarcity on economic growth could make India a closer economic rival to China by 2050 than current projections indicate. Because future defense spending is generally projected within a relatively narrow percentage range of Gross National Product (GNP), these potential variances in economic growth could have significant effects in both of these countries, as well as disproportionately affect economically underdeveloped countries in the region, where people are highly dependent on environmental resources, widening the wealth disparities within and between states. This could affect U.S. interests by increasing social stratification and weakening social stability in countries like India and China, where large wealth disparities already exist.
2.1 Nonlinearity
<12> Water issues will frequently influence the strategic environment in a sharply nonlinear fashion, with constant causal factors existing over time, followed by the absence and then sudden emergence of effects of large magnitude. This will make these events difficult to predict and plan for. Flooding in Bangladesh illustrates this point. Reduced water flow in the Ganges below could, over time, cause a steady but imperceptible rise in the river bed level in the Ganges because of increased deposition rates. A sudden increase in flow from a flood could then cause catastrophic flooding, as the river overruns its banks. Global climate change is another example of this phenomenon. Gradually accelerating hydrological cycles, driven by rising global temperatures, could suddenly cause two coastal storms in two consecutive years of a magnitude that would normally only occur once every fifty years. Such an increase in extreme weather events, coupled with the continuing destruction of coastal mangrove buffer zones, could suddenly make large urban centers on coastal plains unlivable due to flooding, destruction, or saline water intrusion.
3. Territorial Disputes
<13> Water could become a driver of territorial disputes in South Asia. Watercourses change over time and regularly create and dissolve land formations. Many boundaries in South Asia are based on or related to water bodies. The changing patterns of watercourses could spark concern about territorial claims, possibly sparking a conflict. Furthermore, the potential conflicts and disputes could have reverberating effects, most notably affecting U.S. national security interests in the region.
<14> Such a problem already exists involving the Chinese, who have active or latent territorial disputes with Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Myanmar, and India. The most recent large conflict over border issues was between China and India in 1962 over the Aksai Chin region. China and India also contest the northern areas around Kashmir ceded by Pakistan to China, the McMahon line in northeast India, as well as the borders of Arunachal Pradesh and the status of the Sikkim territory annexed by India. Many of these disputes derive from the colonial era, when national boundaries were set by foreign powers. Contemporary Chinese strategic thought also reflects a concern with a long history of territorial deprivation, including broad territories in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Mongolia, and the Russia Far East.[5] Border troop mobilizations are reported in India on the northern border from time to time, reflecting a concern with tension in border relations between China and India. China has generally pursued a restrained approach to border disputes, preferring to seek accommodation when necessary to improve important bilateral relations and where accommodation is not possible without ceding important Chinese claims, preferring to postpone resolution of border disputes. However, an unresolved problem could cause this already tenuous issue to boil over.
<15> Needless to say, such a dispute could have sociopolitical repercussions on a global scale. Traditionally, China has sought to influence events and developments in its periphery through economic penetration, diplomatic balancing and political intimidation, not generally relying upon the use of force, but by maintaining a strategic periphery that is free from encircling alliances and populated by regimes that are friendly to China. China has sought to limit or exclude the economic and political access of other great powers to areas that lie within its strategic periphery. China’s objective of maintaining a friendly strategic periphery is interrelated to its domestic political objective of a strong political order and its objective of having a great power status. China has exhibited a belief that a stable non-threatening strategic periphery is essential to maint aining domestic political order and has used its influence to cultivate vassal-like relationships that enhance its great power image.
<16> China has sought to pursue its strategic objective of maintaining and increasing influence over its strategic periphery through development projects, hydro-electric power in particular, as an economic, political, and diplomatic tool that will allow it to more closely integrate these regions into its orbit, while at the same time enhancing its regional image as a great power through the provision of favorable financing. For example, China will seek to pursue water development projects in a way that is perceived as beneficial by the countries of Southeast Asia, such as sponsorship of flood control projects on the Lancang ( Mekong). This project is both intended to allow China to act in a beneficiary capacity to Southeast Asia, while at the same time asserting Chinese influence over Southeast Asian affairs.
<17> Such actions could have several implications for U.S. national security interests. For example, not all of the countries of South Asia will perceive China’s actions as benign. The manner in which these countries perceive China’s actions will be largely dependent upon historical relations and other regional strategic objectives that these states may have. In particular, Vietnam will be unlikely to perceive China’s actions as completely beneficial. Vietnam has a history of antagonistic relations with China and was occupied or controlled by China for several centuries. Vietnam views China’s involvement in Southeast Asia with mistrust. Already, Vietnam has taken the unprecedented step of publicly voicing concern that China’s actions on the Lancang may not be in the best interest of all the countries of Southeast Asia. In this context, China’s development of water in its strategic periphery could both stir up political instability, as well as offer the U.S. potentially unique strategic opportunities.
<18> Furthermore, attempts by China to use water to increase its control over its periphery could weaken relations that the U.S. has with these peripheral states, such as Pakistan and Thailand. This could also limit the extent that the U.S. can improve relations with potential allies like Vietnam. The visit by the Vietnamese PM to the U.S. recently is a sign not merely of thawing relations between the two countries, but also a strategic ploy by the U.S. to secure Vietnam’s cooperation in containing China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia. However the strategic environment contains not only Vietnam and other Southeast Asian nations but also India. China may attempt to use the development of water resources in Tibet on the Brahmaputra as a vehicle for working more closely with India and smoothing strategic differences. This, in turn, could diminish the contemporary prospects for cooperation between India and the U.S.. Nonetheless, President Bush’s recent visit to India underscores the importance the U.S. is now paying to the strategic relationship with India. The U.S.’s decision to allow advanced nuclear technology for India’s civilian use is a milestone in that direction since India is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The strategic environment is most certainly dictated by the U.S.’s need to contain China’s (and to a lesser extent Russia’s) rising prominence in the region.
<19> Global disruption could occur indirectly as well. Maintaining a stable, strong domestic political order has always ranked as a top strategic concern for China. China believes that social chaos and political fragmentation are a constant threat to the Chinese state and that the best way to avoid this outcome is to maintain strong, unified leadership. While China’s external security environment has improved dramatically over the past ten years due in large part to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China’s domestic order has been challenged by a series of dynamics set in motion by domestic economic reforms. The recent statements by Chinese President Hu to involve the central government in developing inland China have been carefully calibrated to minimize protests by displaced rural inhabitants. In 2005 alone, China saw 75,000 protests of varying degrees by displaced state industry workers and dislocated farmers.
<20> Water issues could frustrate the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic objective in several ways. First, water shortages threaten the stability of China’s domestic social order. Farmer riots have occurred over access to water and environmental protests have formed around the degradation of water resources. Second, water shortages threaten economic growth. Third, infrastructure projects designed to address water shortages will cause political friction among province leaders and between province leaders and leaders in the central government.
<21> These stability issues could have several implications for U.S. national security interests. First, China might externalize its problems with domestic stability by launching a more aggressive foreign policy agenda. Historically, China’s foreign policy has been subject to domestic political struggles and has at times been used as a vehicle to react to domestic situations. The historical prominence of individual leaders in shaping Chinese foreign policy has, in the past, led to Chinese foreign policy reflecting domestic power struggles. Although China’s contemporary foreign policy process is much more institutionalized than it has been, the continued prominent influence that communist party leadership has on the direction of China’s foreign policy could cause a leadership dispute over domestic problems related to water to spill over into the foreign policy arena. Taiwan, rather than Japan, might become the political flashpoint and this will surely draw the U.S. into the arena. Taiwan’s claims to independence have in the near past sounded hollow since cross-strait investment by Taiwan is now in the billions (Cliff, 2006). Nonetheless, Taiwanese leaders do not wish to accept China’s promise of autonomy and sign any treaty; the case of Hong Kong demonstrates China’s all-too-easy attitudes in reneging on its treaty promises. Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian’s comments in late February that he was ending the committee to oversee eventual reunification could lead to a more aggressive Chinese stance against Taiwan.
<22> Secondly, an ineffective state response to rising domestic instability caused by a confluence of effects from forced relocation, economic migration, urban unemployment, urban violence, rural poverty, food shortages, and agricultural protests could undermine the rule of law in China. In an advanced form, the rise of domestic instability described above could irreparably weaken Chinese domestic leadership and cause the power of the Chinese state to deteriorate. Such a situation would cause the business environment in China to become unfavorable and would weaken levels of foreign investment, which would erode China’s ability to continue to grow economically. It is unclear how an economically weaker China would react internationally, but it would contribute to less predictable foreign policy and possibly erratic decision-making. However, a fluctuation in China’s economic growth would limit Chinese military modernization and acquisition plans, causing China to have superpower military capabilities (i.e. enormous naval resources) later than currently projected. This could also encourage China to focus more heavily on asymmetric warfare in order to compensate for slow modernization.
4. China as the Great Power
<23> China has long sought to act like and be recognized as a great power. This self-image derives from China’s size, longevity, economic wealth, political power, and the influence that China has been able to wield over much of Asia since the imperial era.[6] Currently, China appears to be seeking to establish and legitimize a hegemonic order that provides security and stability throughout Asia. As China becomes increasingly integrated with the international economy and dependent upon foreign markets and energy supplies, China will seek an even larger role in regional and international affairs. Already as the U.S. and Britain (to a lesser extent) withdraw or downsize their operations in the South Pacific, China's forward posture in this region mirrors its aggressive diplomacy in other regions such as the Middle East, Africa and Latin America: increasing numbers of high-level visits, no-strings-attached aid packages, and investments in industries and critical infrastructure. Checking Taiwan remains a high priority for Beijing, but it no longer explains all of its activities in the South Pacific. However, beh ind the radical departure from the past where China was merely content to play by the global rules, China is now ready to reference its hegemony vis-à-vis the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, the EU. Its modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (a defense budget of U.S.$65 billion is the estimate by analysts, although China denies this figure) is a sign of things to come. The daring moves in the South Pacific are designed essentially to reorient its strategic objectives to meet plans for a more prominent economic and military role in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, China is poised to replace the U.S. as India’s largest trading partner in the next five years, thereby giving it more prominence in global trade circles and developing a more sustainable relationship with India that is not fraught with mistrust. As the U.S. tries to congage (contain plus engage) China, and possibly Russia, via its stakes in Afghanistan and the insular Southeast Asian states (Vietnam and Myanmar), China is readily spending its large holdings of U.S. dollars ($850 billion) by investing in infrastructure and other capital projects in these various regions in order to wield its influence. In addition to that, China has the blueprints to build a navy in order that it might project its influence beyond its maritime and terrestrial territory. All of these elements combine to reiterate China’s new objectives for the next 50 years or so.
<24> However, water shortages in China could undermine this strategic objective if they were to cause the Chinese state to look like it is unable to cope with this problem and its effects on China’s society, political system, and economy. China’s ability to address water shortages and provide adequate access to water resources will have implications for China’s image as a powerful state. China’s concern for its great power image will tend to cause the leadership in the country to act aggressively to convey the impression that it is dealing with its water shortages. If China is ineffective in dealing with water shortages this will frustrate the development of a great power image, possibly causing China to react aggressively by pursuing additional power projects and military acquisitions. Already, China’s military budget exceeds $60 billion a year and is climbing. These new acquisitions are mostly from Russia, and Putin’s recent visit to China secured not only a pipeline deal to funnel large quantities of fuel and gas to China but also to secure a multibillion arms deal to supply the Chinese with the most advanced aeronautics, satellite and other military hardware. Whether these deals are to replenish or rebuild the PLA is left to be seen since it is also a strategy to convince Taiwan to surrender any wishes it may have for independence.
5. Alternative Worlds
<25> As briefly discussed prior, water could affect the international security environment in China and South Asia in a number of ways that might implicate U.S. security interests. Of primary concern is how water will affect the most populous, wealthiest, and most militarily powerful states of India and China. The following “alternative worlds” scenarios attempt to imagine how water might affect these two different states under different conditions over the 2050 time horizon. While not full scenarios, they offer an insight into how the social, economic, and political problems brought about by water scarcity could gather momentum and suddenly have nonlinear effects on both of these countries, as well as on all of South Asia, and how these countries might or might not respond to these problems. The first case examines what might occur if China continues its economic growth pattern, but then is eclipsed economically by the Indian regime. Many believe that China’s economic growth is not sustainable and has many problems that will eventually lead to a collapse, creating a situation where India will surpass China as an economic power. Therefore, the first case looks at a fifteen year period where China will remain as an economic power and then a second period to 2050 where the Chinese economy suffers a collapse and the Indian economy is in a sustained economic growth situation. The second case examines what is likely to happen if the agriculture in the Northern China plan collapses, creating a situation of food insecurity in China.
5.1. Chinese Success: 2005-2015
<26> India’s weak federal system impedes its ability to make effective headway in managing population growth. As India’s population eclipses the size of China’s population and continues to grow, the demands of such a rapidly expanding population begin to bog down the Indian government, further reducing its efficacy. India possesses no effective national means for resolving domestic disputes over water resources. Therefore, India’s federal system acts as a weakness because the country is unable to control emerging conflicts between Indian states, which possess legal authority over water resources through their state constitutions. State authority continues to expand vis-a-vis federal power as more areas of jurisdiction are devolved to the state level in response to state demands for more autonomy. Pressures from uncontrolled population growth continue to weaken the federal institutions that do exist. India continues to rely on adjudication by the Supreme Court to settle domestic conflicts over the division of interstate water resources, which further weakens the rule of law as it attempts to settle political issues through legal means.
<27> As the rule of law, already suffering in India under the weight of pervasive corruption, begins to deteriorate, the predicted levels of foreign direct investment might fail to materialize. Without foreign direct investment, the domestic capital markets are unable to maintain adequate levels of investment, causing a downturn in economic growth. Softer economic growth further weakens the tax base, which is already small due to very low collection levels. This in turn weakens the authority and fiscal power of the central government at the same time that the central government attempts to launch large new public investment in the water infrastructure sector. These government initiatives, heavily focused on massive damming projects, meet with enormous political resistance similar to the opposition to the Narrmada project. India’s democratic system facilitates the efforts of a host of environmental actors, farmers, and industrialists to thwart the construction of these projects. India’s system of governance does not, however, provide an alternative response to pressing water needs.
<28> The failure of the central government to meet projected water demands in the northern Indian states further weakens the central government vis-a-vis these states and further impedes economic recovery, causing the central Indian government to lose influence with insurgent and separatist groups. The popular belief that it is the government’s duty to provide water to its citizens causes a public backlash, especially among the lower castes where large numbers of people are growing in social and political awareness against the government for its failure to act.
<29> A one-in-fifty year drought now occurs every seven years due to regional climatic changes, exacerbating temporal water distribution problems and challenging the administrative power of the central government. Drought relief projects are plagued by slow moving bureaucracy and by the lack of cooperation between states and between states and the central government. These drought relief projects expose corruption within the central government, which weakens the legitimacy of the government and causes a crisis in political leadership.
<30> This loss of legitimacy and crisis in political leadership ensures that no major political decisions are made, thus inhibiting the development of water infrastructure and causing a more intense degree of water scarcity. The absence of any meaningful civic institutions to mediate between the society and government ensures that the government becomes increasingly fragile, inflexible, and unable to adapt to evolving circumstances or resolve complex problems.
<31> Increasingly frequent droughts will cause more water shortages throughout rural India. Large commercial farmers are able to continue to grow crops by using large pumps to extract deep groundwater. As large farmers draw down water tables, smaller subsistence farmers’ tubewells begin to run dry. These small farmers begin to abandon cultivation of their land and migrate to urban areas in search of employment. The influx of large numbers of agricultural workers overwhelms the urban labor markets, causing an upswing in unemployment and a rise in dependence on government welfare services. The major Indian cities, already bursting at the seams and suffering from water shortages and poor sanitation levels, experience difficulties with public health as disease spreads and local urban food supplies run short.
<32> Naturally occurring and artificially induced temporal water distribution problems in Bangladesh cause large levels of cross-border migration into India in West Bengal and the northeastern states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. These migrations inflame border tensions between the two countries and fuel support for insurgency and separatist movements within India.
<33> Nationalism in Assam rises in response to the influx of Bangladeshis, who begin to live on plots of Assamese farmland along the Brahmaputra. The United Liberation Front for Assam (ULFA) insurgency group launches a vigilante border patrol group that attempts to push back the immigrants into Bangladesh and Bengal. Local Bengalis fear that the waves of Bangladeshi immigrants are going to push the entire region into poverty and chaos and demands that the central Indian government stem the flow of immigrants into India and restrain the actions of ULFA.
<34> The central Indian government, fearing secret support from Bangladesh, China, and Myanmar for separatist movements in India, acts hastily without sufficient intelligence and mobilizes land forces up the Brahmaputra into Assam and along the Meghalayan and Bengali borders with Bangladesh. ULFA responds with guerilla tactics, quickly forcing the Indian army into a humiliating withdrawal. Border skirmishes ignite between India and Bangladesh, with several thousand people on both sides of the border killed. Relations between India and Bangladesh collapse, with both sides seeking to retaliate against the other for what each perceive as hostile intentions. Indian troops use the issue of Sylhet, a border territory ceded by British India to East Pakistan ( Bangladesh) at the time of the partition in 1947, to launch an incursion into Bangladesh. India blatantly violates the 1996 Ganges Water Accords, diverting large amounts of water at the Farraka barrage into southeastern India. Bangladesh experiences immediate agricultural repercussions from decreased irrigation and increased salinity intrusion, which causes increased migration to India and domestic instability within Bangladesh.
<35> A flare-up in relations between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir conflict further distracts the Indian central government from dealing with water scarcity within India. Emboldened by the Indian central government’s preoccupation with Bangladesh, as well as the success of ULFA tactics against the Indian army, Kashmiri rebels launch a new spate of attacks on Indian positions in the northwest of India. Pakistani ISI officers and retired Pakistani military officers cross over into Jammu and Kashmir to offer logistical support to the Kashmiris. A desperate Indian leadership threatens Pakistani with war.
<36> These foreign policy crises fuel a domestic crisis. Gujarat, one of the wealthier states of India, urges moderation in the dealings between the Indian central government and its neighbors and launches a political initiative to change the Indian government into a confederal arrangement of states. Economic growth differentials between states have caused large disparities in wealth to emerge between the states. This initiative is spurred on by resentment among the other wealthy states such as Arunachal Pradesh, which view the central government as attempting to redistribute their money to the poorer states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, while at the same time failing to effectively and efficiently administer the functions of a central government.
<37> During this same time period, China, on the other hand, experiences similar water shortages, but is able to respond to these problems more effectively. During this short time horizon, the combination of China’s relatively strong market system combined with its autocratic political power enable China to plan for future water demand and marshal economic resources to meet these demands, while at the same time increasing the efficiency of water consumption.
<38> China effectively manages water consumption in the Yellow River basin and, through cooperation between the central government and province governments, increases the flow of the river at its mouth into the Yellow Sea, thus avoiding environmental disaster and large-scale salinity intrusion.
<39> The building of China’s Three Gorges Dam is completed (full completion in 2009), creating a large reservoir behind the dam, and in the near future the dam will be a major supply of power, which reduces the amount of coal that China would otherwise burn. China is able to improve its enforcement of environmental regulations through closer cooperation between the central and provincial governments, thus reducing the effluent pollution upstream of the Three Gorges Dam and preserving the quality of this water for municipal, agricultural, and industrial consumption. The reservoir behind the Three Gorges Dam is connected to one of the variants of the “South to North Water Diversion” routes, thus delivering water volumes to the areas where water scarcity is the greatest. The arrival of 10 billion cubic metres (bcm) of additional water supplies a year in the north China plain allow Chinese agriculture to continue to expand the amount of cultivated land under irrigation, thus increasing agricultural production meeting much of China’s food supply issues. Further efficiency is achieved by increasing logistics of transporting and distributing food to consumers, where levels of waste had been very high.
<40> The shortfall in food supply that China consumes but is unable to produce is acquired on international grain markets in gradually increasing volumes, which does not drastically upset international grain prices. Chinese political leadership pragmatically chooses to adhere less rigidly to its policy of food security, which would require massive state subsidies to agricultural producers in favor of less state interference in the markets and continued economic development. This move is partially in response to pressure from the World Trade Organization to liberalize Chinese agriculture and partially in response to the reality that market forces are already heavily influencing behavior of Chinese agricultural producers. This transition away from agricultural self-sufficiency occurs quietly and gradually and is not politically contentious.
<41> The continued economic development contributes to the maintenance of regime stability and the political leadership uses this stability to launch initiatives to revamp urban water distribution systems, increase efficiency in agricultural and industrial consumption of water, and build new desalinization facilities along the coastal areas.
<42> The healthy economy continues to generate a solid tax base, which gives the central government access to much of the capital it needs to build other variants of the “South to North Water Diversion” project, which transports water volumes from the headwaters of the Tsingpao and Lancang to the northern central regions of China. China moves ahead with these plans irrespective of claims from Chinese provinces and from countries of Southeast Asia that such projects would violate riparian rights of downstream users. The autocratic system of government reduces the influence of the popular political resistance to these massive water control projects from the people within China affected by their construction. Criticism of China from the countries of Southeast Asia over China’s diversion projects are muted by the influence that China now wields over this entire region. All of these countries in Southeast Asia are closely integrated economically with China and fall within a Chinese condominium of influence.
<43> The delivery of new water supplies to the north of China facilitates new economic development in these regions, which attracts migratory populations and alleviates population density problems in the eastern coastal areas. The economic growth in these regions enhances the political legitimacy of the Chinese government and the control of the central government over the non-Han ethnic populations living in these regions.
5.2 Indian Success: 2015-2050
<44> Although initially a strength in dealing with water scarcity, China’s strong state mentality becomes a vulnerability over the long term. China’s water policy continues to be driven by large strategic priorities, rather than local level initiatives designed to increase efficiency. China invests in water supply development just as it invested in acquiring access to international oil supplies, paying market premiums in a strategic bid to prevent shortages from endangering national security. The government’s preoccupation with large water infrastructure projects causes the state to over-extend itself financially. This results in excessive sovereign borrowing on domestic capital markets, which crowds out private investment, crimping economic growth, and creates a large debt burden, the service of which requires increases in taxes and lower spending in other vital government sectors. Higher taxes and lower levels of public investment further curb economic growth.
<45> Several enormous investments in dams and long distance inter-basin transfer projects are unsuccessful due to rapid sedimentation rates and industrial and agricultural pollution. The Chinese central government, while good at launching these large initiatives, is unresponsive to constructive domestic and international criticism of these projects. Several water-rich provinces in the south begin to resist major inter-basin transfer projects that would divert water from these regions without compensating these provinces for the water resources at market prices.
<46> Resistance within these provinces is fueled by the growing middle class that has developed during the past several decades of economic growth. This middle class is angered over perceptions of insensitivity among central government bureaucrats to the large population resettlement programs that are mandated by these new damming and inter-basin transfer projects. The province governments’ are left to deal with many of the consequences of these resettlement efforts, most of which cause immense social and economic disruption. The resettled populations all have a significantly lower level of earnings and lower standard of life.
<47> Some portions of these populations displaced by new water projects resist resettlement and are added to the ranks of the growing migratory population that seeks itinerant work and which imposes great costs on urban welfare systems. China’s government becomes increasingly concerned with urban unemployment, which causes a slowdown in privatization of state owned enterprises. This large underperforming sector of the economy generates some additional employment, but continues to cause a misallocation of investment, adding to growing structural problems with China’s economy.
<48> The growth in the migratory population further reduces central government control, as it is not able to effectively regulate this increasing segment of China’s population that has no permanent residence. This weakens China’s ability to maintain stable population growth and adds a strong element of disorder to the Chinese society.
<49> The central government does not implement remedial measures to prevent these large scale water projects from incurring costly environmental damage. This environmental damage actually reduces, rather than increases, the net usable water resources in many regions. The government incurs large expenses in building these enormous projects when there are a series of less expensive efficiency measures that could more effectively alleviate regional water scarcity by decreasing water demand. The government does not advance efforts to restructure the economy to achieve higher levels of economic output per unit of water, but continues to plan for industrial production and regional economic growth based on water supply projections from its inter-basin water transfer projects. Unmet water demand in the West could cause China’s western economic development initiatives to falter. Chinese central control over these outlying areas may diminish, as they devolve towards other Central Asian republics. China, having embraced a less stringent policy of food security, has now lost control over its grain production and becomes heavily dependent upon international grain markets. While this is economically more efficient, as it allows farmers to grow certain crops in certain areas where they enjoy a comparative economic advantage, it entails a significant and irretrievable loss of political power for the central government. Chinese farmers no longer abide by regional grain production requirements, but either produce more valuable cash crops or fruits and vegetables, which make more efficient use of irrigation, or migrate off of the land to the urban centers in search of other work. Instead of the expansion of cultivated land and irrigated land planned for by the central government, the aggregate amount of agricultural lands steadily shrinks in China, as urban and industrial sprawl takes more and more land out of agricultural production.
<50> Although the government has lost much of its power to implement agricultural policies, the autocratic planning process for grain production quotas does not readily adapt to this new reality. Overly optimistic projections for grain harvests cause food shortages throughout much of the country. In one year the effects of these food shortages are magnified by a one-in-seven year drought that causes famine in several western and north-central regions of China.
<51> This famine severely shakes the authority and legitimacy of the Communist Party. At the same time, China’s economic growth, slowed in part by inadequate water supplies in the north, begins to falter as its partially liberalized economy is unable to continue to efficiently allocate capital investment. The combined effects of the famine, economic slow-down, growing civil disorder, and contentious relations between province and central government structures leads to a crisis of Communist leadership and a change in government.
<52> India, after having experienced severe problems with water scarcity over the past decade, has become smaller, with several states separating off from the main Indian state. However, over time, India begins to respond more effectively to the multitude of problems posed by continued increases in water demand. India’s weak central government proves to be a strength, as it does not commit India to a small set of large-scale large-budget solutions to water scarcity. Rather, it forces the economy to adapt to a water-constrained environment through migration to other crops, improvement of state-level water infrastructure, and increased levels of efficiency in water consumption. The weakness of the central government also allows the Indian society and economy to respond in a flexible fashion to water scarcity. This is particularly important in light of the macroclimate changes occurring across India. Some regions experience an accelerated hydrological cycle that increases water availability to the point that local governments need to contend with flooding more than drought. Other regions experience more frequent and more intense droughts, requiring new water systems and higher levels of efficiency in water consumption.
<53> The absence of large centrally planned and financed water projects has a positive effect on India’s environmental system over a long period of time, as major river systems are not distorted by damming and diversions. Not having financed these large water projects, India’s sovereign debt situation is improved, alleviating pressure on the Indian budget.
5.3. Collapse of Agriculture in the North China Plain: 2015-2030
<54> China maintains its policies on food security, which require that China remain self-sufficient in the production of food-grains. China continues to use price controls and agricultural subsidies to stimulate agricultural production at great economic and political cost. China spends money on inter-basin water transfer system to divert surface water from the south to the northern plain, however these volumes are insufficient to satiate the skyrocketing demand. To meet this demand, China continues to rely on unsustainable levels of groundwater extraction.
<55> As the aquifers in the north fall further and further from the surface, China begins to experience large scale land subsidence, which fractures roads, bridges, natural gas and sewer lines, and urban structures. The quality of water extracted decreases as the level of water continues to fall. The excessive mineral content in this extracted water accelerates the rate of salt deposition on the irrigated lands, instigating a decline in agricultural production. The failure of farmers to provide for drainage systems triggers widespread water-logging of the soil. The smaller farmers begin to reach the bottom of their wells and turn to other crops or migrate to urban areas. The larger farmers sink deeper and deeper wells to continue extracting groundwater.
<56> By 2015, large areas of agricultural land in the north China plain are either unusable because of soil salinity or water-logging or because of insufficient water supplies for irrigation. China exhausts its one year of strategic grain reserves and is faced with an imminent food scarcity problem. China turns to international grain markets and immediately begins buying large quantities of grain to supplement its dwindling production. In the process, China expends large amounts of its foreign currency reserves, which weakens China’s international economic influence, the strength of China’s currency, and the ability of China to insulate itself from the international economy. The rapidity with which China moves from nominal grain imports to massive dependence on international sources of grain precipitates a crisis in the international grain markets. Skyrocketing prices cause food shortages throughout the world.
<57> China ’s loss of its strategic foreign currency reserves severely hampers its ability to respond to a financial crisis that causes a run on its currency. The fall-out of a massive financial crisis in mainland China spills over into Hong Kong and Taiwan, fanning out throughout the world. As the famine drives people out of the rural north China plain, large waves of migration pour over into the Russian province of Siberia, the southern regions of China, and Southeast Asia. Border skirmishes occur between Russia and China, with Russian forces attempting to block passage of these immigrants into Russia. Historic resentment in Southeast Asia against ethnic Chinese rises, as the economies of this region are overrun by waves of unemployed low-skilled Chinese laborers and farmers.
<58> In a moment of crisis, the Chinese leadership announces that it will launch a multi-billion dollar damming and diversion initiative to move more of the water from the south of China, much of which normally flows into Southeast Asia, to the north of China. China claims that this is a matter of national security and immediately begins work on a number of different projects in Tibet and Yunnan on the Brahmaputra, Salween, Red River, and Lancang ( Mekong). China closes the dams that have already been built in the south of Yunnan on the Lancang in order to begin to retain water for diversion to other parts of China. The Mekong flow slows dramatically, causing water shortages throughout Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The states of Southeast Asia pull together under the auspices of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) to protest the action and to ally themselves together against China. India sends an emissary to a plenary session of the MRC to offer assistance. China declares that India is interfering in the politics of Southeast Asia.
<59> The Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia shrinks dramatically in a matter of months and begins to become saline as it misses the replenishing flood waters of the Mekong. Fish harvests from the Tonle Sap, which constitute the major source of protein for the Cambodian people and the major source of export revenues for the Cambodian economy, severely decline and Cambodia requests international humanitarian intervention.
<60> The fragile, pulsed ecosystems of the Mekong delta in Vietnam, the breadbasket of the country, immediately experience negative effects from the reduced flow in the Mekong. Salinity intrusion into the groundwater becomes a widespread problem that causes Vietnam’s rice production to collapse. The reduced flow of nutrients from the Mekong causes negative impacts on the aquatic and marine life in the mouth and off the shore from the mouth of the Mekong. Fisheries decline, negatively affecting the livelihood of fishermen from Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. When China attempts to divert the Red River, Vietnam launches a preemptive strike against the dam, destroying the foundations and causing large casualties. Fighting ensues for several months before the Vietnamese forces are quelled.
6. Uncontrolled Population Growth and Decline in Public Sanitation
<61> Population control strategies are completely ineffective across China and South Asia over the next fifty years. Populations in China and India both top 1.6 billion, while the populations of Pakistan and Bangladesh more than double. Water supply per capita plummets in all countries as the development of new supply fails to keep up with the rise in water demand caused by the expanding populations.
<62> This inadequate access to fresh water resources causes wide-spread malnutrition, as states are unable to increase food production quickly enough to meet the demand of the growing populations. The poorer segments of the population, which comprise the vast majority of the total population of South Asia, suffer the most, as they are unable to pay for imported grain. These poorer segments of the regional population migrate across international borders, inflaming tensions between Pakistan and India, India and China, and Vietnam and China.
<63> Inadequate access to water resources causes an increase in water-born diseases and a decrease in public sanitation. This has a long-term negative effect on demography throughout South Asia, weakening public health. Although there are no immediate mortality crises, this weakening effect causes deterioration in the capabilities of the workforce, hence curbing long-term economic growth.
<64> The effect of uncontrolled population growth is relatively uniform across South Asia, overwhelming the administrative power of states with and without strong adaptive capacity. The magnitude of uncontrolled population growth, combined with the attendant tertiary effects caused by this population growth, is simply too extreme for even strong states like China or resilient states like India. Weaker states like Pakistan and Bangladesh collapse. Large states like China and India begin to fragment, as the stress of managing growing populations exacerbates relations between provinces and central governments.
7. Conclusions
<65> Conflict over water resources is rare and has not occurred for thousands of years. However, the dynamics in South Asia are changing in such a way that a conflict in the next thirty-five to forty years may be unavoidable. Population growth, economic growth, and expanded agricultural production will continue to push water demand higher. As demand increases, water supply will diminish and there will be more widespread water scarcity issues in the region. Due to this likely shortage, water could become a catalyst, both directly and indirectly, for conflict in the region.
<66> Water shortages in South Asia are likely to cause food shortages, political struggles, environmental effects, migration problems, and dampen economic growth. All of these factors separately will not increase the probability of conflict. However, most, if not all, of these problems are likely to occur simultaneously generating widespread panic and despair that creates an environment that is conducive for political and social discord. Much of the focus of potential conflict will center on China and India, but, as we have shown here, it would be a rather large mistake to forget about the smaller countries in the region, such as Vietnam, because they will be affected most.
<67> How this situation will unfold is unknown. This paper, as part of a larger study on water resources in China, India, and Southeast Asia, has provided several highly probable scenarios and results of what may occur. In this paper the effects of a water shortage, such as food shortages, political and regional strategic ramifications, migration problems, and dampened economic growth, in South Asia have been detailed. These effects may cause territorial disputes in South Asia that could cause global instability and affect U.S. national security interests. T he resulting instability would force the U.S. to choose how to congage China. China, on the other hand, will also react to the situation as the regional superpower, rushing to claim its perceived rightful place in the new century. Two scenarios were presented in the paper that outline how each of the stakeholders might respond. However, complicating matters more is the uncontrolled population and poor sanitation in the region. These obstacles make an already tenuous situation even more worrisome.
<68> Water may seem to be an unlikely candidate to cause such stress and turmoil. However, the shortage of water may be the catalyst of the next great conflict. As has been shown in this paper, water shortages potentially have global ramifications. With the building of the Three Gorges Dam, water shortages in South Asia are likely to be widespread. Therefore, South Asia has come to the forefront as the region most likely to be in turmoil. While water may not be the main antagonist for a conflict, it is likely to be one of the primary ingredients that might give rise to upheaval in the region. Only by a thorough examination of the needs of the various states for adequate water supply and the public policies that result can future conflict be avoided.
Works Cited
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Notes
[1] This paper arose as a result of the authors’ ideas and research about the significance of the region known as Asia. Andre Gunder Franks’ ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) has perhaps played an influential role in helping to decide where the authors’ focus should be. Additionally, the research for the paper also arose as a result of deep and extended discussions with colleagues about the need for the United States to address the nexus between China and India and the implications for global security and the need for securing resources. While this paper does not address the concerns of the United States in depth (this is to be dealt with in a later essay), it is but a small but important link to a larger project that was conceived to explore the implications of water shortages in China-India and the riparian states of Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Cambodia and Thailand) and the potential for conflict as a result of the need to secure this essential resource. [^]
[2] Worldwatch Institute, “State of the World 2005 Trends and Facts – Water Conflict and Security Cooperation.” http://www.worldwatch.org/features/security/tf/5 [^]
[3] Kumar, C.P. (2003). “Fresh Water Resources: A Perspective” Draft for the National Institute of Hydrology, Roorkee, Uttaranchal, India. [^]
[4] Wolf suggests that water could affect linear economic projections, noting how, on the surplus side, favorable monsoon weather is thought to have contributed to economic performance that exceeded economic projections in India in the 1993 to 1997 period. See Asian Economic Trends and Their Security Implications, Charles Wolf, et. al., 2000. [^]
[5] Michael D. Swaine and Ashley Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, Project Air Force, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, p. 9. [^]
[6] Swaine and Tellis, p. 15. [^]