Reconstruction 10.4 (2010)


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Trauermarsch: German history as remembered by the Extreme Right / Emily Turner-Graham

Keywords: Memory, identity, popular culture and cultural power in the 21st century

<1> It is now well documented that Germany and Austria have struggled to come to terms with their catastrophic recent pasts and to recast their national identities from the tarnished faces with which they emerged from the Second World War. What now needs to be considered is the conundrum currently faced in these countries as extreme right groups become increasingly popular (Minority Rights Group International) [1] and those carefully considered and re-examined collective memories of the past and reconstructed national identities are brought into question. The Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party or NPD), one of Germany’s most stridently extreme right parties, and Austria’s Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria or FPÖ) which is occupying an increasingly extreme right position on the political spectrum, have presented precisely this challenge. In the case of the NPD, the historical significance and horrific nature of the Nazi annihilation of European Jewry has been downplayed, while the Allied firebombing of Dresden has been labeled to be just as much of a ‘Holocaust’; similarly the FPÖ is led by a man with neo-Nazi associations in his past and a present habit of repeatedly revising Austria’s wartime history in favour of the Axis side.

<2> This attempted revision of these long-held and carefully crafted national understandings of self go to the very heart of how collective identities are constructed and of how national pasts are recalled and it makes clear that Germany and Austria’s long, painful road to recovery from the disgrace of the war years is anything but over. This is especially so given that their complex pasts are currently being re-packaged and re-presented with the aid of contemporary popular culture mediums, which give these revised national identities and historical memories a greater immediacy and relevance to the custodians of these difficult histories—Germany and Austria’s youth.

<3> In order to most usefully examine the contemporary material and events which are creating these myths, this paper will employ overall the discursive-historical approach of cultural discourse analysis. (Richardson and Wodak) [2] This methodology is focused on four areas—

The immediate, language or text internal co-text…the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses…the extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frameworks of a specific ‘context of situation’…and…the broader socio-political and historical contexts…(Ibid) [3]

That is, the aim is to analyse text in context, in order to fully explore the contexts in which a text is produced, consumed and understood. To elaborate further upon this model,

First, the immediate, language or text internal co-text, which takes into account issues such as textual coherence, cohesion, and “the local interactive processes of negotiation” (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 41), such as turn-taking, question/answer and so on. With regard to political posters and leaflets, co-textual analysis can orientate to the relations between words and images, and particularly the ways that meanings can be worked up through joint processes of visual and linguistic discourse. Second, there are the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses. This level of context takes into account the history and intertextual references of terms and concepts used, or the ways that a concept is mentioned, or discussed, in different texts and in different genres. For example: in what ways has immigration been discussed historically? Does this differ between genres? These intertextual and interdiscursive relationships can, and should, be examined in terms of continuities and discontinuities with the current period.

Third, there are the social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’. Accordingly, if the object of analysis is a party election leaflet, this would need to be contextualized as a party election leaflet – that is, a text produced at a particular time, by a particular organization according to a particular set of discursive criteria. Fourth, analysis should take into account the broader socio-political and historical contexts within which the discursive practices are embedded. This fourth level of context is ‘history’ as it is conventionally understood – the broad stories of the complex interactions of people, organizations, institutions and ideas. These four layers enable researchers to better deconstruct the meanings of discourse and how they relate to context. (Ibid.) [4]

<4> So, to begin, let us consider the broader context of national identity in order to put extreme right revisionism into context. The on-going debate surrounding national pride in Germany encapsulates the continuing complexity of this overall issue and provides a broader context into which current, popular understandings of history and identity can be placed. The statement “Ich bin stolz, ein Deutscher zu sein” (I am proud to be a German) has long aroused complex debate. During the ‘Stolzdebate’ (Pride debate) of 2001, when Laurenz Meyer, General Secretary of the Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), proclaimed pride in his nationality, Jürgen Trittin, a politician representing Die Grünen, accused Meyer of “having the mentality of a skinhead.”(Connolly; Art)[5] Johannes Rau, at that time president of Germany, continued the debate, stating that he was “happy and grateful [to be German but] couldn’t be proud of it.” (Connolly)[6] The then Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, claimed the middle ground, noting that “I am proud of the achievements of people and of the democratic culture. In this sense I am a German patriot, who is proud of his country.” (Connolly)[7]

<5> The German public, as reflected in Germany’s popular media, has taken a similarly complicated position. Brigitte magazine, Germany’s most widely read magazine for women with 3.6 million readers, delivered a concise examination of the question in its editorial on 20 March 2001. “What images come [to us], if we read this sentence? [I am proud to be German]”, it asked,

Skinheads, violence, combat boots. Stupid men with complexes, [and] women with blond hair, who find that impressive. Arrogance and social exclusion, brutal encroachments upon non-Germans. Or do we think…[of]…the North Sea, the mountains, the Grundgesetz and the German poets and philosophers? [And so] idylls, liberty, equality, fraternity [and] cultural heritage? (Brigitte) [8]

The conclusion that Brigitte reached is that Germany is a special case, with a special relationship to its past.

Whether German national pride [will] finally [denote]… the innocence which it enjoys in other countries [is the question]: for instance in Thailand…[in front of] many houses the flag of the kingdom flies and nobody thinks ill of it. But we live in Germany and not in Thailand. …[T]he sentence “I am proud to be German” causes by its historical …context…[the conjuring up of] evil spirits - of arrogance and social exclusion, of racism and violence. (Brigitte) [9]

Some readers wholly agreed, but some were outraged,

I am completely…shocked [by this] extremely one-sided report. Why is the statement: “I am proud to be a German” said in [the same] breath as…right-wing radicalism or fascism…Can't I be proud of, for example, our Baden-Wuerttemberg, which was able to obtain the lowest unemployment ratios or…by far the smallest occurrence of right-wing radicalism…in a CDU governed Bundesland!? No people can shake its history off, it belongs to us, …[as it does] to each country and people. Even if it contains sad and terrible events….(Brigitte) [10]

<6> This debate is one, it has been said, that “Germans…do every year!” (Gesche) [11], and as such it is also worth looking at what public reactions have been to this question more recently still, since the Meyer-Trittin fracas which brought it into sharp focus in 2001. Through successive periods of postwar denial then the assumption of a nationally borne burden of guilt, the question remains of how to approach German history and so, understand German national identity. There are marked generational differences in response, such as the mixed feelings apparent amongst those who may have had a parent or grandparent alive during the Third Reich. The Brigitte market, pitched at women between thirty and sixty years of age (that is, essentially the group mentioned above), would mostly respond to the editorial’s message of Germany’s ‘special’ status with regards to nationalism as well as a shame-ridden concern or apprehension with a notion of national pride (Mayer) [12]. In 2007, this sense remained in a poll taken on the same question by the Kölner Stadt Anzeiger. Respondent ‘Micha L.’ stated baldly that “Good pride [i.e. a ‘benign’ pride]…is not appropriate in this case [i.e. of Germany].” (Kölner Stadt Anzeiger ) [13] Some participants were reluctant to even identify as Germans,

My opinion [is that] there is only the [category of] “humans” [rather than Germans]. And whether one now lives on one side or the other or [whatever the history of] the region [is], or [what] of…emperors, it [should] not play a role. (Kölner Stadt Anzeiger[14]

Only 11.11% of respondents said that they were unequivocally proud to be German. 38.89% said they were “proud to be German, but not as the Nationalists understand it.” Fifty percent said that they were not proud to be German. (Kölner Stadt Anzeiger)[15]

<7> A more obviously youthful demographic, however, showed a contrasting perspective. At the ‘Planet Olliwood’ internet chat room—where a variety of aspects of German culture are discussed from a youth oriented angle—66.67 % of respondents stated that they were proud to be German, 8.33% said that they were not and 25% were not German and so could give no reply. (Planet Olliwood)[16]

<8> “Pride in one’s nationality=Nazi?” ‘Seek’ queried sceptically. “…[C]an I say that although I am no Nazi I am proud to be German” (Planet Olliwood) [17], ‘Steini’ proferred, suggesting that Germany’s current youth were more able to see a middle ground between national pride and virulent nationalism. (Planet Olliwood) [18] ‘Stormi’ put the same idea forward but in more striking terms, asking, “which land with so much shame is still so good?”. (Planet Olliwood) [19] There is an acknowledgement of the past, but a desire to move beyond it and focus more on the positive (and recent) components of German identity, rather than solely upon the negative as their parents’ generation may have done. Yet is this attitude dismissive of the past? At ‘Yahoo Clever Deutschland’, one participant—identified as ‘gammler’—encapsulated all of these threads by demanding,

Why shouldn't I be proud of my country? All other [nationalities] are allowed to be, but for us there has to be a trace of [a bad] aftertaste! I say this without [being] RIGHT [wing]. That’s when everything goes wrong. Our country can achieve much! (Yahoo Clever Deutschland)[20]

<9> National pride need not necessarily be associated with the extreme right wing, it is argued here, but it need not be non-existent or come with in-built shame either. At this site, 47% of respondents (that is, the greatest number to participate) agreed with ‘queequeg’ in stating that they felt most national pride during the World Cup. (Yahoo Clever Deutschland)[21]

<10> Does this seeming change in youthful notions—that is those of the current generation of Germans—on national pride suggest a rise in Deutschtumlei (pride in Germanness) among certain sectors of Germany’s young people? What, indeed, is meant now by Deutschtumlei? Is it possible for Germany’s youth to be proud of their nation without being mired in historical debate, as some of the cyber-comments above suggest a desire—even a defiance—for? One boy recounted in Der Spiegel the tale of his mother who

became very upset when he and a group of friends tied a German flag to their tent during a summer camping trip. “Hey guys,” she said angrily, “you must be nuts, where do you think you are?” But what the boy’s mother didn’t notice was that all the surrounding tents were flying flags—Dutch, British and Hungarian—and that no one seemed to care about that. (Cziesche) [22]

<11> Most importantly, has this on-going confusion helped to create the right environment for the proliferation of ‘alternative’ histories tainted with the biases of the extreme right in recent years? As Ian Buruma acknowledges “multi-narratives [on this topic] continue to exist”. (Buruma, 21)[23] Has a situation developed wherein national identity is no longer synonymous with the Nazi past but has that past instead been slowly anaesthetised and now adopted as just one of many pop culture symbols? Has a ‘negative’ history instead been adopted by today’s youth—in stereotypically rebellious fashion—based on the idea that the antithesis of mainstream opinion must by definition be best? And has all this worked in tandem with the development of an increased number of mediums for these alternative histories directed mainly at the young, most notably the Internet? Finally, how great a concern is this, given that “right wing extremism is largely a youth phenomenon”? (Art, 202)[24]

<12> Ian Buruma also supports this in suggesting that many young people especially are “returning to the images of the previous dictatorship [that is, the Third Reich] as a rebellion against the DDR [and its legacy].” (Buruma, 188) [25] This supports the idea of history as a pop culture icon which can be picked up and put down and is also evidenced in the case history of former leading neo-Nazi Ingo Hasselbach, who documented his experience in Führer-Ex. [26] Similarly there is also a sense of “[W]e’ve had enough of Auschwitz, now let’s mourn our own.”(Buruma, 307). [27] Equally the argument put forward by the German historian and politician Christoph Stölzl that “you cannot mourn psychologically for something you didn’t do…All you can do is something symbolic, ceremonial” is a common one throughout many countries confronted with difficult histories and allows for a contemporary disassociation from the past. (Buruma, 237)[28]

<13> Roland Bubik, an extreme right writer for such seminal rightist publications as Junge Freiheit, stated in 1993 that “new possibilities for influencing people are arising in the area of communications networks. In particular, the entertainment industry…has an immense influence, that has until now gone unremarked.” (Hooper) [29] The development of a communication network such as the Internet, and its capacity for influence, since 1993 need hardly be stated. The ‘New Right’, as a considerable percentage of Europe’s ‘respectable’, stylised but still extreme right wing are now described, has certainly capitalised on these three things: the need—particularly from the young ‘EU generation’—for a clarified identity, the youthful reaction to the continuing lack of that clarification from mainstream society and the potential of the Internet to create and disseminate a renewed and reconstructed national character and so finally provide clarification.

<14> The Internet has allowed for the widening influence of “the…New Right…[in]…the media, culture and education” (Woods, 28) [30], as well as becoming a powerful medium for creating national mythologies, and “[t]hese…[right wing] organisations have an Internet presence which is growing in importance for the dissemination of New Right ideas.” (Woods, 1) [31]

<15> So it is that despite official bans on Nazi imagery, in Germany Hitler’s voice can now be downloaded as a cell phone ringtone and Nazi symbols are available as screensavers. (Cziesche) [32] Germany’s key extreme right party, the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, National Democratic Party of Germany), has launched Projekt Schulhof (Project Schoolyard) which allows young people to download from their website free of charge what has long been termed ‘hate-rock’ music—music which often promotes in its lyrics a glorious and mostly mythical German past. (Oehmke) [33] On a lighter but no less suggestive note, the terrifying nature of the Nazi regime has been downplayed and Hitler has become no more than a comical figure of fun in the numerous ‘Hitler Rant’ parodies on You Tube.[34] As the man himself ‘says’ in one such online rage “yet somehow they have made me funny”. (Ibid.) [35]

<16> Clothing labels like Thor Steinar, who sell a considerable amount of their products over the Internet (they have only three retail outlets throughout Germany), are attempting to convert the symbols of Nazism and a particular reading of Germany’s past in general into pop culture icons. Men’s singlet tops resemble those worn by the Hitler Youth, replete with eagle emblems, while women’s t-shirts are promoted as being made for ‘Valkyrie girls’.[36] Runic symbols and Viking inspired images—long distorted to promote a fabled Germanic past—festoon everything from hats to parkas. The provocatively titled online clothing stores MaxH8 and Nordic23 sell similar clothing to Thor Steinar. (link)[37] austria-fashion.at primarily sells shirts embroidered with a map of Austria, along with the words, ‘I am from Austria—this is my land’.[38] Recently, Heinz-Christian Strache, leader of Austria’s right-wing FPÖ, has released a t-shirt which shows his head topped with Che Guevara’s trademark beret and flowing locks and underneath the word ‘StraCHE’.[39] This is clear example of trying to invent a hip and rebellious right. The t-shirt provides a striking companion to his rap singles, “The HC Rap—Austria First” (2006), “Viva HC” (2008) and “Österreich Zuerst—The EU Rap” (2009), in his on-going attempts to popularise, commercialise and thus bring into mainstream culture a strident nationalism. Through what is becoming known as “brown merchandising”(Kolthoff) [40] a völkisch Weltanschauung and resultant historical perspective for the twenty-first century is being proferred, and many of its youthful recipients—sufficiently removed from the actual historical events in question and often deadened to their significance by saturation-style school teaching on the topic—now simply see Nazism as part of a vast pop culture pantheon. The National Socialist era and its visual accoutrements are useful for rebelling against society’s standards—in Germany particularly the pervasive hypersensitivity to the Nazi era has triggered both devious and dramatic reactive expressions of right wing culture—so a growing number of young people are now blank slates for receiving the New Right’s modernised message.

<17> Alain de Benoist, the leading intellectual of the French Nouvelle Droite (New Right) since the 1980s, has written extensively on the importance of gaining “cultural power” in order to spread an extreme right wing message beyond the societal fringes. For populist right wing parties—such as Austria’s FPÖ—the importance of gaining pop cultural power is even more significant. De Benoist argues that this sort of control will allow for “a gradual transformation of general attitudes which means a slow transforming of people’s minds” and emphasises that “it is culture that is deployed in this war of position.” (Woods, 29) [41] Further, and the youth demographic must be borne especially in mind here, “[t]he growth of leisure time, much of which is occupied by cultural activity” allows for the potential success of this approach, which makes for “the susceptibility of the public to a ‘metapolitical message’ [to] provide the starting point.”(Woods, 29)[42]

<18> This, combined with, at best, a growing ambivalence towards, and at worst, a complete misunderstanding of history in some societal quarters allows for the current repackaging of the historical symbols of the Nazi era by the extreme right to both drive home similar political points to those made by their ideological forebears while also ingratiating themselves and their message into popular culture.

<19> So it is that today’s more outwardly respectable “brownshirts in pinstripes” (Woods, 2) [43], as Der Spiegel describes the New Right, “attempt…to gain cultural [rather than racial] acceptance for a self-assertive nationalism that is uninhibited by the Nazi past and about its attempts to undermine German democracy.”(Woods, 2) [44] On one level the New Right rejects National Socialism and yet on another, it is preoccupied with it (Woods, 4-5) [45], given its role in Germany especially as both the most profound expression of an extreme right wing ideology yet also as the greatest impediment to a significant resurrection of German nationalism.

<20> The New Right sees a gap for its ideology in addressing an apparent cultural despair present in Europe (and, indeed, throughout much of the Western world). They address themselves to those most likely to be affected by this despair (again, youth) by rejecting the concerns and social mores of the (often left-wing) ‘68ers’ and instead focus on the ‘89ers’, that is, those who have grown up following the collapse of communism in Europe and the continued development of the European Union. (Bubik) [46] 1989, the Right argues, “marked the end of Germany’s post-war history, and Germany should no longer allow itself to be led like a bull by the nose.” (Woods, 8) [47]

“I like this style of music [very much], [be]cause my philosophy is…traditionalism…[W]e love the history of Eurasia, Germany and Italy in the 20s-30s...”: the re-telling of history and the re-shaping of memory

<21> The extreme right has infiltrated various musical genres as a major part of its attempt to address this ‘cultural despair’ through the altering of national identity and history tropes. Yet, precisely because of this increasingly successful slide into popular culture, it is difficult to ascertain exactly who is listening to “hate rock”, and so, equally difficult to determine the extent of its influence. As the Institut für Medienpädagogik group D-A-S-H notes, “love of the music” can allow, for example, a heavy metal fan to easily cross over into similarly heavy Nazi-themed bands.[48] George Eric Hawthorne, the Canadian former neo-Nazi who founded Resistance Records and was a part of the hate-rock band RaHoWa, was amongst the first to realise, for example, a fruitful link between Black Metal and White Power music. (Goodrick-Clarke, 205) [49] So too, “somebody with a “Landser” tape in his car tape-deck doesn’t necessarily look like a Skinhead.”[50] Neo-Nazi band, Sleipnir, encapsulate this idea in their song, “Rebellion”:

They [their listeners] don’t wear bomber jackets,
Are nationalist despite everything,
Go to the football [and to] parties
Their heads are not shaved. (lyricstime.com)[51]

<22> H.C. Strache has also tapped into this notion with his various rap singles—politically motivated pieces set to a popular rap beat. This is despite D-A-S-H stating in 2005 that “neither far-right nor xenophobic positions can be found in the roots of hip-hop, rock ‘n’roll, techno [or] reggae.”[52] Strache’s 2006 rap, “The H.C. Rap”—which was downloaded 158,000 times over the space of a couple of recorded weeks in 2006 in a population of 8,316,487 (that is, by one in fifty people), therefore represents a change in how extreme right messages are being portrayed in popular culture. (Rauschal) [53] The French nationalist rapper Goldofaf presents an even more virulently nationalist face within the same musical genre in such tracks as “Gravé dans la roche”.[54]

<23> The questions of national identity inherent in these musical endeavours are manifest in many guises throughout Europe, and these questions have developed a newly honed focus within the context of the EU. As a result, a consistent cultural parochialism—aided by Nazism’s increasing benigness and an overall distortion of history in popular culture representations—has opened another door for the extreme right into youth culture. “In rural areas and small towns” especially, people are “sooner or later confronted by whether they are for or against foreigners”.[55] An apparently ‘normal’ group of teenagers presented to the media as ‘typical’ German youth at the release of the Saxony-Anhalt government’s ‘Respekt’ CD stated that “[t]here are far too many…[foreigners]…in Saxony-Anhalt…foreigners always act up…Russians and Turks are given privileged treatment while people “with a right-wing stance” are “discriminated against”. (Oehmke) [56]

<24> Strache’s hip-hop rap, by employing such a popular form of music, easily inserts itself into mass consciousness and acts as a soundtrack and affirmation to these sorts of problematic social stances. So too, similarities can be drawn between it and the interconnection of popular songs and nationalism in Serbia in the 1990s, when “a process of ethnification [took place]…in which popular music contributed to the estrangement, alienation and distancing of the Other.”(Hudson, 157) [57] Part of Strache’s rap reads:

I’m only saying what we’re all thinking to ourselves:
We no longer want our land given away
to people, our culture not appreciated,
our laws broken!
For anyone who doesn’t want to integrate,
I have a destination,
go back home, have a good flight!
We already have enough of our own unemployed.
Burglary, robbery and raids,
everywhere crime is rising fast.
Opening the East is an “amazing” thing.
It’ll be heartily greeted by your H.C. Strache.[58]

<25> Neo-folk music has also allowed for an intersection between national identity, youth culture and a growing anaesthetisisation and, indeed, aestheticisation of extreme right imagery, as well as allowing for a widening of the rightist musical net still further. (Turner-Graham) [59] Although beginning as one of many branches of the subcultural Goth movement in the 1990s, by entering into a “youth culture that has…generated its own distinctive media of music and magazines” has given the sometimes dubious visage of Neo-folk the opportunity to be spread widely. (Goodrick-Clarke, 212)[60] With the predominance of the Internet also, it is now able to disseminate its Weltanschauung far more broadly than was ever previously possible. Equally, while it should be stressed that there are many proponents of Neo-folk music who could in no way be associated with a fascist aesthetic or be suggested to have fascist sympathies, there are still many within the genre whose image and public pronouncements require closer consideration within the context of a growing ‘fascistisation’ of youth culture by way of the World Wide Web. This contextual examination is especially required given the following description of the genre as “folk music-inspired experimental music that emerged from European ideals and post-industrial music circles”[61], and its proclamation that it is “Looking for Europe”—but which one?[62] Douglas Pearce, lead singer of one of the key bands of the genre, Death in June (itself a reference to June 1934’s Night of Long Knives), stated in 2005:

I’m very happy…because I see Death in June as part of a European cultural revival. I’m pleased that the Old Gods are being resurrected…[as well as]…Old symbols…(Powell) [63]

<26> Other notable Neo-folk groups go by inflammatory names such as Blood Axis, Luftwaffe, Kapo and Strength through Joy, and just as the Nazis themselves borrowed what symbols of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century völkisch movement they saw as being pertient to their cause (and derisively discarded others), so too do these new interpretors of the fascist aesthetic. Runic symbols adorn their websites and CD covers alongside—in the case of Death in June, for example—SS-esque death’s head symbols and the image of a leather-gloved hand clutching a rolled-up whip. Der Blutharsch, well-known exponents of the style from Vienna, have employed the Sig rune (as used by the SS) and the iron cross surrounded by oak leaves as their symbols and were renowned for perfoming at concerts by the light of flaming torches, to the sound of martial drumming while dressed in uniform-like costumes replete with jodhpurs, knee-length leather boots, leather cross-straps across their chests and runic patches on their shirt sleeves.[64] In an indication of both their referencing of and attitude towards German history, their lead singer, Albin Julius, was photographed posing ‘ironically’ in front of a large sign at the entrance of an art exhibition focussing on the Nazis’ infamous Entartete Kunst (Degenerate Art) exhibition. In keeping with a common theme of the extreme right, Julius seems to be suggesting that his right to artistic expression through his music is being repressed by political correctness just as the Nazis repressed and denigrated ‘Jewish’, modernist art in 1937.[65]

<27> While it must of course be conceded that there is certainly a degree of theatricality in the fascistic poses adopted by these bands—the apparently fascinating, erotic power associated with Nazi emphemera of which Susan Sontag speaks must be factored in here—in the opinions they express there can be no doubt that there are also less superficial beliefs at work. (Sontag) [66] In 1998, Julius stated the following in Black magazine:

I am optimistic…[that]…the European Union in the new millenium …[will]…dissolve and our continent [will] hopefully again [be composed] of national states, and…migration [will] finally [be] stopped.[67]

With reference to World War Two, Julius stated in 1999:

It’s not my job to judge the role of Russia in World War Two—as this is an interview about music and not politics. I can just tell you that history is always written by the winners—but I think soon it might be rewritten.[68]

<28> Der Blutharsch also collaborated in 2003 with Italian neo-Fascist musical group Zetazeroalfa. The impact of the image projected by the band is made clear on its website’s guestbook where the utterances of fans illustrate the extent to which fascistic language has entered pop culture parlance: “Heil DB” lauds one, and praise is given for Der Blutharsch’s apparent support for Social Darwinism, “the law of the strong, this is our law, and the joy of the world.” Dimitry Kaznacheev writes from Russia,

I like this style of music [very much], [be]cause my philosophy is…traditionalism. I am a member of the National Bolshevi[k] Party of Russia, we love the history of Eurasia, Germany and Italy in the 20s-30s, Russia in 1917-1945…we hate America.”[69]

<29> Equally, even if Neo-folk could make a genuine claim that the imagery they employ is simply an aesthetic expression, it must also be acknowledged that “[s]hocking people in this context also means inuring them, as Nazi material enters the vast repertory of popular iconography usable for…ironic commentaries…”(Sontag) [70] In inuring the public consciousness—especially the youthful public—to fascist imagery, the question of collective memory, historical memory and national identity is consierdably problematised. Susan Sontag stated in her well-known treatise on Leni Riefenstahl’s work, “Fascinating Fascism”, that “the trick is to filter out the noxious political ideology of her [Leni Riefenstahl’s] films, leaving only their “aesthetic” merits.”(Sontag) [71] With many exponents of Neo-folk, the ‘noxious political ideology’ of historical revisionism and appropriation is pointedly filtered in. (Turner-Graham) [72]

History, politics and memory in the 21st century

<30> Thus, with the profusion of Nazi and extreme right friendly pop culture spread increasingly widely by way of the Net, bringing into question tacit views of the past and so understandings of the present to an ever widening group of (often young) people, Austria and Germany’s extreme right politicians now—more than ever—have a promising canvas on which to paint revisionist histories.

<31> At the start of 2008, the FPÖ’s Bundesparteiobmann Heinz-Christian Strache exclaimed at a headline-grabbing press conference, “Ladies and Gentlemen of the Press, learn your history!”[73] At this press call Strache was in the process of explaining his own past. In January 2007, photographs had surfaced of him as a young man in 1990 in camouflage uniform, ‘playing paintball’ in the German woods with members of the neo-Nazi youth group, Wiking Jugend (Viking Youth). Questions have been raised as to whether it was merely paintball or in fact para-military training in which he was participating. He was also photographed posing in the same uniform at a war memorial. This is one of several known meetings Strache had with the WJ during his youth. (Horaczek and Reiterer, passim) [74] The Wiking Jugend modeled themselves on the Hitler Youth and had the endorsement of and a working relationship with Germany’s extreme right NPD. (Hasselbach, 92) [75]

<32> In earlier photographs from 1987, Strache was pictured giving the three-fingered “Kühnen-greeting” (the neo-Nazi salute which replaced the banned traditional out-stretched arm) while dressed in the cap of his right wing Viennese student fraternity, the Wiener pennale Burschenschaft Vandalia. Most recently, another photograph has surfaced of Strache in the early 1990s attending a Viking Youth meeting. After much public vacillation on the topic, Strache has finally been forced to concede his connections with them and other figures within the extreme right wing scene, including, allegedly, individuals involved in the early 1990s wave of rightist bombings. (Zöchling) [76] Strache has failed, so far, to convincingly denounce either the Nazi period or its modern-day purveyors. (Peham) [77]

<33> Charges of neo-Nazi allegiance were at first vigorously denied and then played down by Strache, though the evidence stacked up accusingly against him and was further compounded by questions arising over his association with well known neo-Nazis like the radical Austrian extremist Gottfried Küssel and also by his lengthy romance with Gudrun Burger, the daughter of (Austrian) extreme right figure, Norbert Burger. Strache protested,

In my whole active political thinking, word and deed in my mandated position as an enthusiastic democrat, [it] has been made clear often and unmistakably. I do not have anything in common with the ideology of National Socialism; in fact I have a decided dislike of it. This body of thought is past for the FPÖ.[78]

<34> At first, Strache had apparently made light of his situation (or indeed derided its significance), claiming that with his three-fingered salute, he was in fact ordering three beers. But as the above quote from the February press conference made clear, he was increasingly keen to obviate or at least explain away his inconvenient history to a mainstream Austrian populace still concerned by the ever-present shadow of Nazism. As a young man, he claimed he was simply “fascinated with military life”, hence the uniform. (Ibid) [79] As for ‘paintballing’ with the Viking Youth, “much more dangerous militaristic computer games [are] played by today’s youth”. (Ibid) [80] Certainly he knew of those associated with neo-Nazism but

[a]s a result of a personal maturing process all those bridges connecting me with [NS] ideology have been burnt. My politics and that of the FPÖ are to maintain a vigilantly distant relationship to all persons who do not draw a sharp, clear line between themselves and NS ideology. (Ibid)[81]

<35> To move on from one’s past and to “draw a sharp, clear line” between it and the present is of course everyone’s right. Indeed, it is highly possible that Strache means what he says and that—in keeping with his New Right persona—he has in fact moved on from paramilitary manoeuvres in the forest. Yet Strache’s attempted revision of this disturbing chapter from his past is suggestive of the complex issues which the extreme right—past and present—represent to the Austrian population. Strache, as we shall see, symbolises a complicated new dimension of Austria’s ‘victim myth’.

<36> Austria has been conflicted since the end of the Second World War as to how its 1938 Anschluss with Nazi Germany should be recalled, preferring largely to be represented as the Nazis’ first victims on their brutal push for Lebensraum, rather than as any sort of collaborationists. This was redressed to a certain degree during the Waldheim case of the 1980s—when a greater acknowledgement of Austria’s wartime association with Nazism was undertaken—but the more accepted (that is, not fringe) role of the FPÖ in Austrian society has meant that their message has often flowed more easily into common discourse. (Art, passim) [82] The 2005 ‘Gedankenjahr’ (a compound word designed to suggest thankfulness but also thoughtfulness) saw the commemoration of a number of events from Austria’s history, to the point that the ordinary Austrian citizen was suffering from a “surfeit of memory”, growing tired of a “search for a usuable past [which remained] heavily state imposed”—and indeed, leaving scope for alternative histories to enter the national lexicon. (Bischof) [83]

<37> The NPD, an extreme right wing presence in the German political landscape for many years, sent messages of support to Strache when he ascended to the FPÖ leadership in 2005, and in doing so established a clear connection between the Austrian right and the more virulent branches of the German right. (Traynor) [84] Yet the NPD have not suffered the qualms of the FPÖ in representing their understanding of the Nazi past. Founded in 1964, the party was a successor to the extreme right and nationalist parties—such as the Deutsches Reichspartei—which abounded in postwar West Germany. They have always made clear their desire to reclaim a nazified German identity from the grasp of what they saw as the illegitimate state of postwar Germany. (Eatwell, passim) [85] Due to the overwhelmingly vigilant stance of mainstream German society on matters relating to the German past, the NPD has had to adopt a more aggressively revisionist position than their Austrian confrères. (Art, passim) [86]

<38> The unrehabilitated character of the NPD has been such that it was keenly and repeatedly attempted (most recently in 2003) to have it banned by declaring it a direct successor to the Nazi Party and thereby having it disbanded in accordance with West German law. Surprisingly all such attempts have failed, including the most recent one in 2003. Although the party has never won the minimum 5% of votes in German federal elections that allow a party to send delegates to the Bundestag, it has maintained steady support since its foundation and is represented in the state parliaments of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.

<39> The FPÖ gained most international prominence under Jörg Haider. Rising through the ranks to become leader in 1986, he became best known for his inflammatory comments regarding Austria’s complex relationship with its past. His reign as leader was ushered in at the Party Convention in Innsbruck at which some party members dressed in Nazi regalia and proclaimed that the outgoing, more liberal FPÖ leader—Steger—should be “gassed” for having failed the Party. (Art, 181) [87] During his career, Haider variously praised the Third Reich’s “proper employment policy”, described concentration camps as “punishment camps”, the SS as “sound, decent men of principle” and compared the deportation of the Jews by the Nazis with the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia following World War Two. (Turner-Graham, 30) [88] Yet under Haider the Party polled an unprecendented 27% of the votes in the 1999 parliamentary election, and the Party joined a governing coalition with the Austrian People’s Party. Despite no longer being in the Coalition, under Strache they currently hold 34 parliamentary seats.

<40> There are a number of historical dates which mark the extreme right’s calendar in these countries. The Rudolf Hess memorial march (Rudolf-Heβ Gedenkmarsch) is perhaps one of the more well known. Since 17 August 1988, a year after the death of Hess in Spandau Prison, neo-Nazis from Germany and throughout Europe have gathered in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, for a memorial march to Hess’ gravesite. These gatherings have been sporadically banned and reinstated from 1991 to the present. The ‘peak’ of the March came in 2004 when around 7,000 neo-Nazis descended on Wunsiedel, making the event one of the biggest Nazi demonstrations in Germany since 1945. The march was banned there in 2005 and the residents of Wunsiedel also retaliated with their own parade and a slogan, “Wunsiedel is multi-coloured, not brown” (“Wunsiedel ist bunt, nicht braun”). Most recently, commemorations have taken place in other German cities and this past year NPD leader, Udo Voigt, was arrested at one such event for inciting racial hatred after he suggested in a speech at Jena that Hess be posthumously awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, following which eight Indian men were attacked by a fifty-strong NPD mob at Mügeln, east of Jena.[89]

<41> For the NPD, Hess is now depicted as a “Friedensflieger” or, literally, a freedom flyer, having deserted the Third Reich by plane in 1941 to (supposedly) try to broker a peace with the English. The youth arm of the NPD, the Young National Democrats (JN or Junge Nationaldemokraten), presented Hess this year on their website in terms with which the left-leaning might similarly refer to popularised revolutionaries like Che Guevara. Such a depiction is an attempt to make Hess—dubious and peculiar to both Germany and the Allies—a decidedly more noble figure. His suicide death is referred to as “murder” and his life, half of which was spent in prison, is referred to mournfully as a “life half lived”. A poem, reputably written by Hess, concludes the Young National Democrats piece which has focussed on the “spontaneous demonstrations” which may happen on 17 August and the “overeager police officers who shoot at young Germans” putting up Hess Memorial March posters. Entitled “We will not be silenced!” (Wir werden nicht Schweigen!), the poem draws obvious parallels between Hess’ apparent struggles and the efforts of today’s Nazis as Hess lambasts the judicial system and protests that “I speak of God, of liberty and of right.”[90]

<42> The claiming by both the NPD and the FPÖ of the allied bombings of German and Austrian cities during the Second World War as being equivalent events to the Holocaust (indeed a ‘bombing holocaust’ or “Bombenholocaust”) is the key plank in the revisionist platform of these two groups and has also caused the most public outcry. In January 2005, in the Saxony parliament, members of the NPD branded the Second World War Western allies as “mass murderers” and accused the British of perpetrating a “holocaust” against Germans. Supporters in the public gallery bayed and one of them was heard to describe the Social Democratic leader of the parliament, Cornelius Weiss, as an “old Jew”. Holger Apfel, leader of the NPD caucus in the Saxon parliament, attempted to put a contemporary spin on his outburst by yelling that “the same mass murderers” who bombed Dresden were now waging new wars, and said that the policies now being pursued by the US and Britain were those of “gangsters”. Another NPD delegate to the parliament, Jürgen Gansel, re-iterated the party’s stance by telling the chamber:

Today we in this parliament are taking up the political battle for historical truth, and against the servitude of guilt of the German people. The causes of the holocaust bombing of Dresden have nothing to do with either September 1 1939 or with January 30 1933. (Traynor) [91]

This performance was followed by an attempt in the parliament to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz with a minute's silence for all the victims of Nazism. Apfel and his 11 NPD colleagues in the assembly boycotted the remembrance by walking out of the chamber.

<43> That same year, on February 13, 5000 neo-Nazis—organised by the NPD—enacted what they called a ‘Trauermarsch’ or ‘funeral march’. Marching through Dresden to the strains of Richard Wagner and waving banners reading “Never forget, never forgive” and “Never again Bombing Terror” they claimed to be mourning the allied firebombing raids. The vast number of marchers ensured that the city’s official commemoration was entirely upstaged. The neo-Nazis were met by groups from Germany’s substantial anti-fascist or Antifa movement and a number of Dresdeners who actually lived through the raids expressed their disgust. One elderly woman said, “This is a terrible day for Dresden—I’m furious. It’s sad to see something like this happening in Germany again.” (Harding)[92] Gerhard Schröder made the important point that, “We will use all means to counter these attempts to re-interpret history. We will not allow cause to be confused with effect.” (Ibid) [93] Yet this march continues to occur annually, in cities and towns throughout Germany.

<44> In 2004, Heinz-Christian Strache made a key appearance at the annual Hero Rememberance service (Heldengedenken) in Vienna. It takes place each year on 8 May, the day of the German army’s surrender in 1945. Strache’s appearance is available on You Tube, thus taking the event and its message to a wide audience. The service involves members of the right-wing student fraternities of Vienna—both current and “Alter Herr” (or, old boys)—marching through the city and then assembling together by candlelight in the Heldenplatz. In 2004, Strache gave the Totenrede (Speech to the Dead) and he stated that those attending the memorial were the true guardians of democracy and that the sizeable Antifa demonstrators who were also present were in fact fascists for suppressing freedom of speech. Strache referred to the “allied bomb terror” of the War and lambasted Vienna’s local council and the “present historical view” for refusing to allow hero status to be bestowed upon the Viennese grave of World War Two Luftwaffe flying ace Walter Nowotny. Another speaker at the service spoke of the “air-terror” unleashed by the Allies and inferred that German wartime ‘occupation’ of Vienna had been preferable to the Allied ‘occupation’ post-1945.[94] Austria’s well known ‘victim myth’, long since reassessed by the nation at large, had been subverted and reclaimed by the right wing. This year the Totenrede speaker again drew attention to another victim myth, this time the “victims” who had been driven out of Eastern Europe following the German defeat, having been installed there in the ‘germanising’ missions of the Nazis.[95] Similarly, the FPÖ has waded further into the ‘Opferdebatte’, comparing the treatment of the Sudeten Germans with that of the Armenians. (Neue Freie Zeitung, 5) [96]

<45> The NPD echoed this new historical focus of the extreme right in what purported to be an NPD internet review of the recent screening of Die Flucht (The Escape) on German television. Die Flucht tells the story of German settlers forced to flee Eastern Europe following the Second World War.[97] The NPD article began with the observation that while a memorial to the “German victims of the Second World War” at Borna in Saxony had stopped work, the Stolpersteine or ‘stumbling stones’, which are set into footpaths all over Germany to remind passers-by of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust who had once lived in the area, continued to be laid. (Reichert) [98] Only one part of German history was being told, the NPD argued.

Survivors of the Holocaust, communist resistance fighters and Jewish survivors have all given themselves to German[y’s] schools, passing through them in an endless stream as they go to preserve their sorrow and ensure it is not forgotten. But only their particular sorrow—not that of all war victims—is the yardstick. Whole classes have been taken to Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald to impress this upon them. That the camps were used by the NKWD [the Narodnij Komissariat Wnutrennych Del or Soviet Secret Service] immediately after the war’s end is not told to the students. Perhaps they would have been embarrassed and have had to ask themselves how it is that the liberator is no better than the so-called perpetrator! (Ibid) [99]

<46> The complexities of German wartime memories are dismissed here by the NPD when they consider those who actually lived through the events depicted in Die Flucht, “What blame for the Second World War do people who are now seventy and who were children at the time carry?” (Ibid) [100] Finally, returning to their historic ideological position, they reject that those remembered with the stumbling stones are Germans at all,

The masses will become mobilised, money will be collected, Stolpersteine will become art and the local politicians will declare that this art is to be appreciated. When will it finally be learned to also appreciate one’s own people? (Ibid) [101]

<47> The complexities of remembering Germany and Austria’s histories remains, despite a greater understanding of past events achieved within the mainstream society of both countries. Now, aided by the new and expansive medium of the Internet, the extreme right can make more forceful moves to perpetutate a version of history and national identity marked by distortion; one which depicts the postwar histories of Germany and Austria as an unamended funeral march.

<48> Equally, with the youthful and more radical Heinz-Christian Strache at the helm of the FPÖ—a man who is not just the child of old Nazis as Jörg Haider was but who deliberately involved himself in the searing extreme right scene of the early 1990s—a similarly radical perspective on Austrian national identity is being developed. Indeed, in 1988, Strache began protesting about the wider portrayal of Austrian history early in his career, by “crying out and whistling” at the premiere of Thomas Bernhard’s play Heldenplatz. (Horczek and Reiterer, 33) [102] Bernhard, regarded in some corners of Austrian society as a “Nestbeschmutzer” for his controversial and confronting literary explorations of Austrian history and identity, depicted Austria’s wartime generation in Heldenplatz as no victims of the Nazis, but rather as war criminals.

<49> Strache, who describes himself as “first Austrian, then German, then European” (Strache) [103]—itself a statement of a specific historical vision—is moving closer to Germany’s more radical rightist traditions and looking to build a “Europe of Fatherlands”, buoyed by historical revisionism and a rejection of the structures already in place for a unified European identity.[104] The building of an alternative idea of Europe has most recently been made easier than ever with the emergence of the Islamic other, of which the FPÖ, the NPD and their ideological compatriots have already made good use. Igniting a fear of Islam and European Muslim communities is high on both parties' priority lists and abundantly feeds their web content.

<50> As such, within this overall context, the FPO’s youth wing—the RFJ (Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend or Ring of Free Youth)— and that of the NPD—the JN—have consistently used the Internet to spread a message of the apparent threat posed by the Muslim community to European identity, principally by way of corrupting the existing European landscape and environment. The NPD, for example, entitle their anti-immigration brochure, “Have a good trip home!”, superimposing the words over a photograph of a group of women in traditional Muslim dress with their backs to the camera and laden with bags, apparently leaving.[105]

<51> The RFJ currently have a video available to watch online entitled “Focuspoint Islam—Islam: the totalitarian system of the tweny-first century.”[106] It’s accompanied by photograph of an imam standing in front of a smoke and fire engulfed building—possibly the Twin Towers—and asks,

What exactly is Islam?
What values and beliefs do Muslims adhere to?
What effect will the progressive Islamising of Tirol/Austria have? (Ibid.) [107]

Similarly, the RFJ in Salzburg has an image on its website, depicting the famous view across the Salzach river to the Festung Hohensalzburg, but with the Islamic star and crescent overlaid onto it. “Half moon over Salzburg?” the caption asks before vociferously replying, “Salzburg is not Ankara!”.[108]

<52> Within this context, the youth movements of Austria and Germany similarly denigrate Muslim communities in their region while yearning for an idealised 'European' world. The RFJ, at its most extreme position, has levelled charges of bestiality as commonly taking place within the Muslim community. (Winter) [109] Aside from confronting social norms, this charge also places Austria’s Muslims well outside the ‘chocolate-box’, idealised environment of the “Alpine republic” which is the “cornerstone of [Austrian] culture” as defined by the RFJ in their mission statement. (RFJ) [110]

<53> Michael Winter, of the Styrian RFJ, stated in a 2006 report “The Islamisation of Europe Strides Ahead!” that the area of Tirol should be regarded as “holy land” which should not be besmirched by the building of a mosque. (Winter) [111] In a further attempt to control Austria’s built environment, Winter has also bemoaned the fact that the distribution of Megaphon, a street newspaper sold by asylum seekers and the homeless on the streets of Graz, disturbs Styria’s urban landscape.

[A]t nearly every street corner, a negro [or nigger - neger] places himself in the way [selling Megaphon]. The streets are a public area, on which one should be able to move freely and, above all as citizens, unimpaired…as a national chairman of the RFJ [in] Styria[,] I demand for all [residents of] Graz: Free roads instead of Megaphon! (Winter) [112]

<54> The RFJ’s 2006 “Salzburg Declaration” on “Europe and Islam” similarly complains of supposed Muslim infringement upon ‘Austrian’ space such as Muslim-only days at local swimming pools as well as the development of “Ghettozones” which have apparently become no-go areas for non-Muslim Austrians. (Salzburger Deklaration) [113] The NPD have taken such attempts to declare a particular area their own one step further with the attempted establishment of “national befreiter Zonen” (national liberated zones, or, put bluntly, ‘foreigner-free’ zones) within their strongholds throughout Germany.

<55> The RFJ—obviously, as a youth organisation—have made considerable use of the Internet to impart their message on the construction and maintenance of Austrian space and as such an alternative view to how Austrian national identity and thus history should be understood. The RFJ in Oberösterreich, for example, heads its page with the message “Die Heimat verpflichtet” (Bound to the Homeland).[114] Accompanying this caption are various appealing views of the region—the town squares at Branau and Freistadt; the lake at Vöcklabruck, a traditional church at Gmunden replete with Eastern European style dome and mountains in the background; the Altstadt streetscapes of Schärding and Linz; the clear blue skylines of Perg and Wels dotted with traditional buildings, a smattering of more modern constructions and the mountain range looming large behind them. Although also taking these local images to the furthest corners of the world, the Internet is primarily idealising and defining familiar surrounds for RFJ members in high definition while the caption compels their connection to this landscape. In a reminiscently völkisch style, it is creating a community between members—as Austrian citizens—and their environment, and so giving them a sense of belonging clarified by what is around them.

<56> The RFJ in Innsbruck has similarly made use of powerful imagery in its video clips available online, accessible either through their website or the popular youth website, You Tube. “RFJ Tirol—Fight for your Homeland!” is their most recent offering. It begins on an historical note, stating

Andreas Hofer [the Tyrolean who led forces against Napoleon] gave his life for his homeland and with him, thousands of our forefathers. His fight for freedom, for tradition and for sovereignty lives again in us.[115]

Old paintings of Hofer’s struggle for the embodiment of Austrian nationalism—the Tyrolean landscape then merge seamlessly with modern photographs of the region, suggesting both the eternal nature of the landscape and the persistent need to defend it. To underline how this defence might translate in modern life, the clip then segues into recent footage of RFJ Tirol members walking through the hallowed Austrian forest carrying Austrian flags and then cleaning a Second World War memorial which had been covered in graffiti by the local Antifa. These FPÖ youth are at one both with the Austrian environment and at one with their historical and current national obligations. “If honourless people visually pollute our holy memorials,” the caption reads, suggesting both the built and the natural memorials shown, “We must come to the fore.”(Ibid.) [116] The seamless visual flow of the clip allows for both a serious and encouraging message to be easily imparted. It concludes with an obvious if partly peculiar appeal to its youthful audience,

Because we love our homeland…
Because it’s fun to fight for the homeland
Because we are true patriots
Will you also fight for your homeland [?]
Because Tirol needs us! (Ibid.) [117]

<57> The message of Austrian land being invaded by alien forces is made even more visually palpable in another video posted on You Tube by the Tyrolean RFJ. Entitled “Watch out!”, it begins with standard scenes of “our beautiful Tyrol”—wildflowers, green fields, snow-capped mountains, cows. Then the screen becomes black and the text reads, “Stop! We [will] keep to the truth”. The idyllic scenes of the Austrian countryside are then interspersed with shots of Muslim women and their children, black people in tribal dress dancing wildly on the streets of Innsbruck, Muslim men at prayer and a mosque being built with an Austrian mountain in the background. Strikingly the clip then segues into material on the lengthy animosity between Austria and Italy over South Tyrol, which still remains Italian territory. A grab-bag of ‘invaders’ of Austria are thus easily spliced together. “Watch out!” the video reiterates as it concludes.

<58> Due to both the ease with which a plethora of images can be selected for viewing on the Internet and the fact that You Tube groups clip together under a common theme, a clip by 18TYROL88 (the use of the numbers ‘18’ and ’88’ clearly signals a neo-Nazi sympathy) entitled “Stop [the] Islamisation [of] Europe” can then be simply accessed from the sidebar by young veiwers of the RFJ’s message.[118] The comparative subliminal subtleties of the FPÖ’s youth videos is made clear by 18TYROL88’s visual diatribe. With a text banner running almost continually along the bottom of the screen, the clip joins together a vast number of images which infer both that Islam is a danger to Europe and that Europe is in increasing agreement on this fact. “The minaret and Muslims [are not about] religious practice,” the text proclaims “They are symbols of power and conquest” and “[a] minaret stands not for religious freedom but for a political goal.” (Ibid.) [119] The sentiment that Islam is most obviously an affront to Austria’s landscape is made clear in a further declaration, “Oriental dwellings should not happen in our Alpine land. Just as oriental clothing, music and culture [should not happen].” (Ibid.) [120] An equally forceful heavy metal song is superimposed over this hard-hitting montage to round out the clip’s overall impression. Part of the song runs,

They rule the land
They're in command
They hold all strings in hand
They are invisible
Out of sight
They've designed
A secret place
To play their games…
Now connect
Don't even ask
Until we're out of it
Everything's at highest stake
Come take a look
We are in
Take a breath
But don't forget
It isn't real
It isn't true
An illusion…
You're cursed
You're damned
You've reached
The promised land
You've crossed the line
You've reached the end. (Blind Guardian) [121]

<59> For a growing number of young people in both Germany and Austria—now well removed from the events of the Nazi era—this has meant a blurring of history and memory so that the views of the extreme right are now able to seep beyond once zealously guarded borders, making perhaps for a generation of “normal types...[marked only by]…their murderous harmlessness.” (Kinzer) [122] Long understood historical interpretations of the tragic events of the Nazi period have been revised and with them a corresponding sense of responsibility and compassion. As a result, notions of national identification can be more easily refocussed, new enemies can be more easily targeted and the lessons of history can more easily can go unlearned.

All quotations and song lyrics attributed to H.C. Strache, material from www.npd.de and online forum responses have been translated from their original German by Emily Turner-Graham.

Notes

[1] Minority Rights Group International, http://www.minorityrights.org/10076/press-releases/rise-of-far-right-in-europe-fuels-spread-of-intolerance-towards-religious-minorities-new-report.html, accessed 24 August 2010.

[2] John E. Richardson and Ruth Wodak, “Recontextualising fascist ideologies of the past: right-wing discourses on employment and nativism in Austria and the United Kingdom”, Critical Discourse Studies, 6:4 (2009), 251-267, 255.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Kate Connolly, “Germans split on right to be proud”, The Observer, 25 March 2001; David Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[6] Connolly.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Brigitte, “Ich stolz, ein Deutscher zu sein”, Brigitte.de, 20 March 2001, http://www.brigitte.de/frau/gesellschaft/nationalstolz/index.html.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Brigitte.de Leserbriefe, 30 March 2001,
http://www.brigitte.de/frau/gesellschaft/nationalstolz/index.html.

[11] Email correspondence with Dr Katja Gesche, 2008.

[12] Nonna Mayer, “How well do opinion surveys measure racism?”, Patterns of Prejudice 35 (4): 2001, 3-5.

[13] Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, “Stolz, Deutscher zu sein?”, July 2007, http://forum.ksta.de/showthread.php?t=565.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Planet Olliwood, “Bist du stolz Deutscher zu sein?”, http://www.planet-olliwood.to/umfrageforum/t-bist-du-stolz-deutscher-zu -sein--49382.html, September 2004.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Yahoo Clever Deutschland, “Bist du stolz Deutscher zu sein? Und warum?”, http://de.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20061022104614AABIGcx, 2006.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Dominik Cziesche, “Shock Mom and Dad: Become a Neo-Nazi”, Der Spiegel, 23 May 2005, http://speigel.de/international/speigel/0,1518,357628,00.html.

[23] Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan, (London: Atlantic, 2009), 21.

[24] Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, 202.

[25] Buruma, The Wages of Guilt, 188.

[26] Ingo Hasselbachwith Tom Reiss, Führer-Ex: Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi, English edition, (Random House: New York, 1996).

[27] Buruma, The Wages of Guilt, 307.

[28] Ibid., 237.

[29] John Hooper, “Flirting with Hitler”, Guardian, 16 November 2002, http://guardian,co.uk/weekend/story/0,3605,839755,00.html.

[30] Roger Woods, Germany’s New Right as Culture and Politics, (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

[31] Ibid., 1.

[32] Cziesche, “Shock Mom and Dad: Become a Neo-Nazi”.

[33] Phillip Oehmke, “Drowning out the Nazi Cacophony: Government woos kids with Democratic Rock”, Spiegel Online, 14 November 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0.1518,516892,00.html.

[34] http://www.youtube.com/user/hitlerrantsparodies.

[35] Ibid.

[36] http://www.thorsteinar.de.

[37]http://germaniaversand.de/index.htm?http://germaniaversand.de/xaranshop_k011010s002_1.htm.

[38] http://www.austria-fashion.at.

[39] http://www.hcstrache.at/.

[40] Albrecht Kolthoff, “Braunes Mechandising”, 30 September 2004, http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/18/18429/1.html.

[41] Woods, Germany’s New Right as Culture and Politics, 29.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., 2.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., 4-5.

[46] Roland Bubik (ed.), Wir ‘89er: Wer Wir Sind—Was Wir Wollen, (Frankfurt-Berlin: Ullstein-Verlag, 1995).

[47] Woods, Germany’s New Right as Culture and Politics, 8.

[48] http://eu.d-a-s-h.org/node/309.

[49] Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism and the Politics of Identity, (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 205.

[50] http://eu.d-a-s-h.org/node/309.

[51] http://www.lyricstime.com/.

[52] http://eu.d-a-s-h.org/node/309.

[53] Andreas Rauschal, “Tanz den HC Strache!”, Wiener Zeitung, 20 September 2006, http:///www.wienerzeitung.at/DesktopDefault.aspz?TabID=4701&Alias=Wahlen&cob=248879&currentpage=14.

[54] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSUR6pn607w.

[55] http://eu.d-a-s-h.org/node/309.

[56] Oehmke, “Drowning out the Nazi Cacophony: Government woos kids with Democratic Rock”.

[57] Robert Hudson, “Songs of Seduction: popular music and Serbian nationalism”, Patterns of Prejudice 37(2) 2003: 157-176, 157.

[58] http://www.hcstrache.at/.

[59] Emily Turner-Graham, “ ‘Keep feeling Fasci/nation’: Neofolk and the Search for ‘Europe’ ”, in (eds.) Sara Buttsworth and Maartje Abbenhuis-Ash, Monsters in the Mirror: Representations of Nazism in Post-War Popular Culture, (California: Praeger, 2010), 201-226.

[60] Goodrick-Clarke, Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism and the Politics of Identity, 212.

[61] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neofolk.

[62] http://www.projekt.com.

[63] Erin Powell, interview with Douglas Pearce, 2005,
http://www.deathinjune.org/modules/mediawiki/index.php/Interview:2005-Heathen_Harvest.

[64] http://www.derblutharsch.com.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Susan Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism”, New York Review of Books, 6 February 1975 22 (1), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/9280.

[67] http://home.pages.at/der-stoerenfried/zeitung/a16/12.htm.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism”.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Turner-Graham, “‘Keep feeling Fasci/nation’: Neofolk and the Search for ‘Europe’ ”.

[73] Heinz-Christian Strache, “Strache: Distanziere mich von allen totalitären Ideologien!”, http://www.fpoe.at/index.php?id=477&backPID=390&tt_news=12083, 7 February 2007

[74] Nina Horaczek and Claudia Reiterer, HC Strache: Sein Aufstieg, Seine Hintermänner, Seine Feinde, (Wien: Carl Ueberreuter, 2009), passim.

[75] Hasselbach, Führer-Ex, 92.

[76] Christa Zochling, “Déjà-vu: Der Billig-Haider. Die Welt des Heinz-Christian Strache. Was er glaubt“, Profil, September 2007, http://www.news.at/profil/index.html?/articles/0543/560/124865.shtml.

[77] Email correspondence with Andreas Peham at the Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, August 2010.

[78] Strache, “Strache: Distanziere mich von allen totalitären Ideologien!”.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, passim.

[83] Günther Bischof, “The Politics of History in Austria”, paper presented 7 April 2006, http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/conferences/Austria/Bischof.pdf.

[84] Ian Traynor, “Dresden parliament in uproar at neo-Nazi outburst”, Guardian, 22 January 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,2763,1396063,00.html.

[85] Roger Eatwell, Fascism: A History, (London: Vintage, 1996), passim.

[86] Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, passim.

[87] Ibid., 181.

[88] Emily Turner-Graham, “The Shunning of Austria” in History Behind the Headlines, Vol. 2, (USA: Gale Publishing Group, 2000), 25-33, 30.

[89] http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/897159.html.

[90] Website of the NPD’s youth wing, the Junge Nationaldemokraten: http://www.jn-buvo.de/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=252&Itemid=33.

[91] Traynor, “Dresden parliament in uproar at neo-Nazi outburst”.

[92] Luke Harding, “Neo-Nazis upstage Dresden memorial”, Guardian, 14 February 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,2763,1412355,00.html.

[93] Ibid.

[94] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DaJLubd-6lM.

[95] http://www.wno.org/newpages/lch50.html.

[96] Neue Freie Zeitung, Advertisement for a lecture: “Armenier—Sudentendeutsche: im Schicksal gleich”, 1 November 2007, 5.

[97] http://www.daserste.de/dieflucht/.

[98] D. Reichert, “Blankgeputzte Erinnerung”, 22 March 2007, http://www.npd.de/index.php?sek=0&pfad_id=7&cmsint_id=1&detail=749.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Horaczek and Reiterer, HC Strache: Sein Aufstieg, Seine Hintermänner, Seine Feinde, 33.

[103]Heinz-Christian Strache and Andreas Mölzer, Neue Männer braucht das Land, (Wien: ZZ-Edition, 2006).

[104] http://www.rep.de/content.aspx?ArticleID=7fc08d65-7502-42d9-94c4-4ce5f90a25b8.

[105] http://partei.npd.de/medien/pdf/gute_heimreise.pdf.

[106] http://www.ibk-land.rfj-tirol.at/index.php?menu=themen&content=themen.

[107] Ibid.

[108] http://www.rfj-sbg.at/main.php.

[109] Michael Winter, “‘Liebe’ Sodomie als Vergewaltigung”, Tangente, 01/2007, http://www.rfj.at/standpunkte/tangente_0107.pdf.

[110] RFJ, Leitbild des Ringes Freiheitlicher Jugend Österreich, http://www.rfj.at/standpunkte/index.php.

[111] Michael Winter, “Islamisierung Europas schreitet voran!”, http://www.rfj-stmk.at/dokumente/Islamisierung_2006.pdf, 2006.

[112] Michael Winter, the Wikipedia entry on the RFJ, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ring_Freiheitlicher_Jugend_%C3%96sterreich.

[113] “Salzburger Deklaration: Europa und der Islam”, http://ooe.diepatrioten.at/standpunkte/salzburger-deklaration-europa-und-der-islam, 2006.

[114] http://ooe.rfj.at/standpunkte/.

[115] http://www.rfj-tirol.at/rfjvideo08.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid.

[118] http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=OGCd8pkpGD4.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Blind Guardian, “Otherland”, www.lyricsmania.com/.../a_twist_in_the_myth_lyrics_31873/otherland_lyrics_345207.html.

[122] Stephen Kinzer, “A Look into the Violent World of a Young Neo-Nazi”, New York Times, 12 December 1992,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3DF1630F931A25751C1A964958260.

 

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